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Abstract

The purpose o f this dissertation is to explore the motivation behind various
restructuring choices within a securities issuance context. Previous theoretical models
and empirical evidence suggest that three methods o f restructuring - equity carve-outs,
sell-offs, and spin-offs, on average, signal favorable information about parent firms.
This has been interpreted as reflecting either enhanced potential for efficiency gains,
positive asymmetric information about the value o f industry assets, o r changes in
agency costs. This dissertation presents an alternative fram ew ork by relating
restructuring announcements to the effects o f security issuance. Em pirical tests are
formulated to determine if these announcements contain valuable private information
about the value o f a subsidiary by analyzing whether or not elements o f this
information apply to other firms involved in related activities.
Rivals o f the carved-out subsidiaries experience negative revaluation effects.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that a motivation for equity carve-outs is
m anagement’s belief that a subsidiary is likely to be overvalued by the market.
Similar to equity carve-outs, the announcement o f the intent to go public releases
elements o f industry-common information that causes downward revaluation o f intra
industry rivals o f the announcing firm. Rivals o f spun-off subsidiaries increase in
value around these announcements which suggests managers believe the subsidiary’s
asset value is greater than the proceeds that equity carve-out o r sell-off transactions
would produce. Although sell-off announcements do not generate significant intra-

viii
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industry effects, there are significant positive share price reactions to rivals o f firms
undergoing general restructurings. This indicates that positive information is released
by these announcements about the value o f the core assets o f the restructuring firm.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The existence o f a m arket for transferring control o f corporate assets enhances
general economic welfare by fostering the discipline to induce firms to com bine
resources into m ore efficient and/or profitable operations. In large part, the literature
on the market for corporate control has focused on merger and acquisition activity.
The results from many empirical studies on mergers and takeovers, summarized in
Jensen and Ruback [1988], and Jarrell, Brickley, and N etter [1988], indicate that
these transactions create wealth, on average, for target firm shareholders which may
or may not be shared by bidder’s shareholders. An equally im portant component o f
the market for corporate control is corporate restructuring transactions. T he decision
to divest assets may reflect managem ent’s desire to create m ore entrepreneurial,
streamlined, decentralized, and efficient firms.
The literature on asset divestiture and corporate economic restructuring, while
not as developed as the literature on mergers and acquisitions, is notable in finding
consistent event study results for different types o f events. These studies indicate
that, on average, voluntary restructuring decisions enhance shareholder wealth. In
particular, Schipper and Smith [1986] document positive and significant returns of
approximately two percent to announcement o f equity carve-outs. Schipper and Smith
[1983], Hite and Owers [1983], and M iles and Rosenfeld [1983] report that spin-offs
announcements are associated with positive and significant returns o f two to four

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

percent. H ite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] find that announcing firms experience
positive and significant returns o f approximately two percent around announcements
o f asset sell-offs.
These studies on corporate asset disposition offer several hypotheses to explain
the motivations behind, and the positive wealth gains from, corporate restructuring
decisions which parallel hypotheses developed in the mergers and acquisitions
literature. These hypotheses include: revelation o f managerial assessment o f asset
value, im proved managerial efficiency, synergies, reduction o f agency costs,
avoidance o f regulatory and tax constraints, bondholder wealth expropriation, opening
the firm to m erger and acquisition bids, and enhancing the opportunity set for
individual investors.
W hile these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, some appear to have
stronger support from empirical results and therefore may be more applicable as
explanations for restructuring decisions. The two dominant hypotheses are: 1) there
are im portant elements o f private information conveyed by restructuring decisions
about relevant assets (Schipper and Smith [1983,1986], and H ite, Owers and Rogers
[1987]) and 2) there are economic efficiency gains from restructuring (Schipper and
Smith [1983,1986], Hite and Owers [1983], Miles and Rosenfeld [1983] and Hite,
Owers and Rogers [1987]). The purpose o f this dissertation is to test the applicability
o f these hypotheses as explanations for the motivation behind economic restructuring
by viewing these different decisions within the broader context o f securities issuance
phenom ena. By analyzing the share price reaction to rivals o f the restructured unit
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and the parent firm, it is demonstrated that the market differentiates between the
signal content o f the three alternative methods o f restructuring - equity carve-outs,
sell-offs and spin-offs.
Detailed descriptions o f the characteristics o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and
sell-offs are found in chapter 2. Characteristics unique to each o f these forms o f
restructuring suggest that different motivations may drive the selection o f the
divestiture mechanism. F or example, an equity carve-out and a sell-off both involve
external capital acquisition, but the form er is an equity issuance decision associated
with public disclosure of inform ation while the latter is a private transaction with little
disclosure o f proprietary information. A spin-off is associated with considerable
information disclosure but does not involve the acquisition o f external capital.
Descriptions o f voluntary liquidations and jo in t ventures are also given in this chapter
to provide additional perspective on carve-outs, spin-offs, and sell-offs.
The major hypotheses developed for each form o f corporate restructuring are
discussed in chapter 3. The efficiency hypothesis, which states that gains related to
the announcement o f an economic restructuring flow from moving resources from
low er to higher valued uses, is addressed first. Gains can be achieved through
economies o f scale or scope, or by aligning managers’ incentives to m ore closely
reflect those of shareholders by creating incentive contracts tied to market-based
measures o f the unit’s perform ance. The asymmetric information hypothesis stems
from the Myers and M ajluf [1984] model o f securities issuance which is built on the
assumption that managers make shareholder-wealth maximizing decisions based on
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possession o f information not available in the public domain. Accordingly, the choice
o f restructuring mechanism reveals this information and allows the market to revalue
relevant assets.
The third explanation for gains associated with restructuring decisions is based
on Jensen’s [1986] free cash flow argument, but is only applicable to restructuring
activities that produce proceeds for the parent firm. In particular, retaining the
proceeds from equity carve-outs and asset sales may exacerbate agency problem s and
lead to excessive consumption o f managerial perquisites. Therefore, unless the
proceeds are used to repay creditors, repurchase equity, o r pay dividends,
restructuring decisions may result in suboptimal investment o f corporate resources.
Because each hypothesis results in different predictions for industry valuation
effects, announcem ent reactions to intra-industry rivals o f the relevant unit and the
parent firm are used as a means o f testing these hypotheses. T he previous literature
on intra-industry rival share price reactions to various managerial decisions is also
discussed in chapter 3.
In chapter 4, the literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) is reviewed.
W hile an IPO is not a form o f economic restructuring, this securities issuance decision
can provide further perspective on equity carve-outs. IPOs are included in the study
because they resemble equity carve-outs in several ways, most notably because both
decisions create a newly traded public firm by issuing equity claims to the public.
From this securities issuance perspective the predicted effects on intra-industry rivals
should be the same for both IPOs and equity carve-outs. Therefore, intra-industry
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effects o f IPO announcements aid in interpreting restructuring decisions within the
context o f securities issuance phenomena.
Chapter 5 contains an explanation o f the methodology used in this dissertation
and descriptive statistics o f the samples used in the analysis. T he empirical results are
reported in chapter 6. Taken together, the event study results support the argument
that corporate restructuring decisions are intricately tied to the m arket’s assessment of
private information possessed by managers. M oreover, the results imply that
restructuring decisions convey elements o f information relevant to revaluing assets
employed in sim ilar activities. In several cases, industry reactions to these events
contradict predictions stemming from the efficiency hypothesis in several important
respects. Although the effects o f agency problems may also be reflected in market
reactions to divestiture announcements, if such effects exist, they are dominated by
information effects typical o f securities issuance phenomena. Chapter 7 contains the
conclusions derived from this study o f corporate restructurings.
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Chapter 2
Transferring Rights to Control Corporate Assets: Mechanisms o f Restructuring

1. In tro d u c tio n
M ergers and acquisitions have long played an important role in firm
development and expansion. M ore recently, going private transactions have also
become an important means to transfer control o f corporate assets. The presence o f a
m arket for transferring control o f corporate assets has important economic
implications because it fosters the discipline to induce firms to com bine resources into
more efficient and/or profitable operations, thus enhancing general economic welfare.
In general, friendly acquisitions and mergers are likely to be motivated by potential
gains in operational or managerial efficiency linked to the existence o f differential
management skills and specialization. Hostile takeovers can also focus on improving
m anagerial efficiency, but are m ore likely to reflect the perception that incumbent
management has failed to maximize firm value.
An extensive literature has documented that control transactions create overall
economic gains and Jensen and Ruback [1983] and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter
[1988] provide surveys o f this literature. There is considerable evidence that the
shareholders o f target firms experience significant wealth increases as a result o f
control transactions, but the evidence is ambiguous as to whether shareholders o f
acquiring firms are, on average, better off. Excess returns to target firm shareholders
may stem from the fact that bids are made by external agents that investigate the value

6
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o f firms and through this process supply capital markets, via m erger negotiations or
takeover bids, with new information pertinent to revaluing relevant securities.
Economic gains reflected in these returns may come from combining corporate
resources so as to seize economies o f scale (e.g. horizontal mergers/acquisitions) or
scope in areas o f management, operations and improved access to capital markets.
Other theories that have been developed to explain the sources o f potential gains
involve resolution o f agency problem s, creation of m onopolistic pow er, and value
enhancing tax strategies.
Voluntary corporate restructuring decisions are closely related to takeovers,
mergers, and going private transactions because each o f these mechanisms is part of
the general process o f resource reallocation in the economy. The dynamic
characteristics o f product and financial markets, manufacturing technologies, and
competition sometimes require a firm to restructure its activities to meet the objective
o f shareholder wealth maximization. Such voluntary economic restructuring decisions
usually entail disposing o f a subsidiary or operating division and contrast with the
decision to dispose o f a single asset (such as a plant) or to undergo a financial
restructuring in which a firm rebalances the proportion o f debt and equity in its capital
structure.
Recent studies on corporate asset disposition have offered several hypotheses to
explain the motivations for restructuring, most of which parallel hypotheses developed
to explain mergers and acquisitions activity. Much o f the empirical analysis indicates
that restructuring activities, on average, enhance shareholder value. Among the
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hypotheses developed to explain these positive gains are: revelation o f managerial
assessment o f asset value, improved managerial efficiency, synergies, reduction o f
agency costs, avoidance o f regulatory and tax constraints, bondholder wealth
expropriation, opening the firm to m erger and acquisition bids, and spanning financial
markets. It has also been argued that asset sales can cause negative valuation effects.
F o r example, an asset sale may be interpreted as a signal o f financial distress o r may
be used to defend against a takeover bid.
Two hypotheses, not necessarily mutually exclusive, that have dominated the
restructuring literature are: 1) there are important elements o f private inform ation held
by managers about relevant assets that are conveyed by restructuring decisions
(Schipper and Smith [1983,1986], and H ite, Owers, and Rogers [1987]) and 2) there
are economic efficiency gains from restructuring (Schipper and Smith [1983,1986],
H ite and Owers [1983], Miles and Rosenfeld [1983] and Hite, Owers, and Rogers
[1987]). Recently, agency cost arguments based on Jensen’s [1986] free cash flow
hypothesis have also been developed by Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1993] as a
fram ework for analyzing asset restructuring. Although sim ilar hypotheses have
evolved in the corporate control literature, there is little published work that integrates
these areas o f research.
The specific types o f asset disposition examined in this dissertation are equity
carve-outs, spin-offs, and sell-offs. Intra-industry share price responses to
announcements o f each o f these forms o f restructuring are examined as a means to
test the applicability o f the hypotheses being tested. M ore specifically, these
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hypotheses render different predictions for rival share price responses fo r one o r more
o f these restructuring events. Therefore, announcement responses can be used to
support or reject specific hypotheses that are being tested. To provide further
perspective on the information effects o f equity carve-outs, which are a special type o f
initial public offering o f equity (IPO), there is also an intra-industry analysis o f the
effects o f announcements o f conventional IPOs.
Three alternative forms o f restructuring mechanisms are analyzed and
compared because each has unique characteristics as a method o f external financing in
addition to its effects on the firm ’s organizational and economic structure. Theories
o f security issuance and related empirical work reviewed in Smith [1986] suggest that
the type o f security utilized, the market mechanism (public o r private), the size o f the
offering, and timing o f the offering may each convey valuable information to public
markets. Each o f these facets o f a restructuring decision provides new information
that allows investors to revalue relevant outstanding securities. F or the issuing firm ,
share price responses to restructuring decisions may reflect changes in the m arket’s
assessment o f firm risk, current asset values, or perceived future cash flows. New
information revealed in the announcement may also apply to firms whose operations
are sim ilar to the announcing firm or the unit involved in the restructuring. In
particular, if an action communicates private information about the value o f relevant
industry assets o r cash flows, then its announcement will cause the revaluation o f
outstanding securities o f firms engaged in similar economic activities. Thus, an
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analysis o f intra-industry effects o f restructuring decisions provides a means to test the
validity o f theories that have been developed to explain economic restructuring.
Relevant financing decisions are intimately associated with economic
restructuring and involve issues such as: the degree o f ownership to be retained in the
asset in question, whether there is access to external capital, the use of private versus
public transactions in capital raising, and the type o f security, if any, that will be
issued. I begin the analysis o f these issues by discussing the nature o f the
restructuring mechanisms available to managers.

2. M echanism s of re stru ctu rin g
General corporate restructurings usually arise from management’s desire to
create more streamlined, specialized, decentralized, and/or entrepreneurial
organizations. Recent literature has discussed several basic forces that can induce a
firm to restructure. First, private information about future cash flows or current asset
values of a division or other unit may induce management to separate a subsidiary
from the remainder o f the parent firm. Second, improvements in managerial
incentives to utilize assets more productively can be accomplished by linking
compensation contracts o f division managers to subsidiary (rather than parent firm)
perform ance through a restructuring. Third, asset disposition may improve economic
efficiency by transferring assets to new owners that have a comparative advantage at
managing them. Fourth, economic restructurings may help resolve agency problems.
F or example, if parent firm managers have been overly optimistic about their ability
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11
to m anage disparate businesses or the potential o f past acquisitions, a form o f
corporate aggrandizement as suggested by R oll’s [1986] hubris hypothesis, asset
disposition can be a means to reverse the misguided growth.

Conversely, Jensen’s

[1986] free cash flow hypothesis implies that agency problems may be exacerbated if
a restructuring decision entails an equity offering o r asset sale because these
transactions generate additional cash for the firm. Finally, a m ajor factor in the
decision to divide the firm may be the desire to circumvent tax and/or regulatory
constraints.
Identification o f a firm ’s comparative advantages allows management to focus
on areas related its expertise and to disengage the firm from activities that lack
strategic fit. Often, decisions about abandoning certain industries and increasing
investm ent in other industries coincide with management’s forecast o f an industry’s
profit potential that presumably reflects information known only to managers. Below
are several examples o f Wall Street Journal announcements o f corporate restructurings
that illustrate management’s desire to adopt m ore efficient and profitable
organizational structures. The first is an example o f a restructuring announcement
that focuses on an "underperforming" division:
Mobil Corp. Feb 25. 1985: M obil C orp’s decision to hire an investment
adviser apparently means the big oil company is coming to grips with
several disappointing non-oil investments, including its M ontgomery
W ard & Co. retailing unit. ... "We are not at all averse to removing
those parts o f the business that are not earning adequate rates of
return,"
M obil C orp.’s management reached the decision that its non-oil investments
were not providing a satisfactory rate o f return on investment. M anagem ent’s
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decision to dispose o f the disappointing investments may indicate that this industry
(retailing) is perceived by M obil’s managers as likely to be relatively unprofitable in
the future. A nother possible interpretation, however, is that M obil’s managers have
no comparative advantage at managing assets in these industries. F or example, the
announcement specifically mentions M ontgomery W ard & C o., a mass merchandiser,
as an under-perform ing asset. Although M obil’s managers presumably have a
com parative advantage in operating an integrated oil and gas company, the set of
management, production, and marketing skills required by a mass merchandiser could
be distinctly different from those required by an integrated oil firm . If so, it may be
difficult for M obil’s managers to assess the effectiveness o f the managers o f its
retailing operations. Thus, it is rational for M obil to divest itself o f subsidiaries
lacking strategic fit. This announcement indicates that M obil also hired an investment
advisor to provide counsel for the restructuring, which presumably includes guidance
on the type o f restructuring mechanism to be adopted.
The announcement o f Freeport-M cM oran’s restructuring provides another
example o f a statement o f managerial expectations with respect to the profitability o f
its businesses:
Freeport-M cM oran Nov 30. 1989: Freeport-M cM oran Inc. outlined a
plan to withdraw from several business, selling $1.2 billion to $1.5
billion o f assets, so that it can concentrate on developing two huge
commodity discoveries. The natural-resources company said it sees
greater profitability in its giant sulfur discovery in the G ulf o f M exico
off Louisiana and its sizable copper and gold find in Indonesia. "From
1989 to 1993 w e’ll be spending alm ost $1 billion to get these two things
on stream ," said James R. M offett, chairman and chief executive
officer.
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Freeport-M cM oran’s announcement indicates that its managers believe they
have a comparative advantage in producing sulfur, copper and gold. Pursuing this
advantage will increase the firm ’s profitability. Unlike the M obil announcement,
there is no indication that the assets to be sold are unprofitable o r perform ing
unsatisfactorily. This announcement also differs from M obil’s because FreeportM cM oran’s managers explicitly state that they intend to "concentrate" on specific
industries by increasing investment in those activities and withdrawing from others.
In M obil’s case future investment intentions were less explicit, that is, they announced
withdrawal from peripheral, non-oil industries but did not specifically indicate where
the proceeds from the sale would be utilized.
G ulf & W estern’s restructuring announcement illustrates that inefficiencies can
arise because o f diseconomies o f scale in management or the presence o f agency
problems in conglomerate firms:
G ulf & Western Industries. Inc. Aug. 15. 1983: "G ulf & W estern
Industries Inc. directors approved a massive divestiture plan... The
divestiture plan, when complete, will leave G&W a leaner and less
complex company than the conglomerate built by Charles G. Bluhdorn,
its founder, who died in February. The new chief executive, M artin S.
Davis, said in an interview that the divestiture plan is the result o f his
efforts to streamline G&W by getting rid o f low-margin industrial
businesses and focusing on three areas: consumer products,
entertainment and financial services."
This "demerger" o f a conglomerate firm may be the result o f a new chief
executive officer realizing that G&W does not have sufficient skills in areas outside of
consumer products, entertainment, and financial services to compete profitably. It
may also reflect a reduction in G&W management’s expectations about the
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profitability o f those peripheral industries. The dem erger may also be the solution to
an agency problem. If the founder engaged in corporate aggrandizement by
overestimating his skills as a manager or the profitability o f businesses acquired
outside o f G& W ’s core operations, the announcement o f the divestiture o f the non
core assets will signal the reversal o f these mistakes and the intention o f current
managers to enhance shareholder wealth.
There are several alternative means to restructure a firm ’s operation, including
equity carve-outs, spin-off, sell-offs, voluntary liquidations, and joint ventures. Each
mechanism has different impacts on the transfer o f private inform ation, control o f the
assets in question, and economic efficiency. The focus o f this dissertation is on
equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs, which are discussed in detail below.
Liquidations, a piecemeal sale o f the entire firm , and jo in t ventures, partnerships with
other firm s, are two other forms o f corporate restructuring that will be discussed
briefly to provide perspective on the nature o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs and selloffs but no formal analysis o f these two types o f events will be included in this
dissertation.
Equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and sell-offs can each serve as methods of
restructuring that achieve greater economic efficiency by moving resources to higher
valued uses. However, from the perspective of external financing and securities
issuance, there are key differences between these alternatives that can provide
valuable insight into the factors that motivate managers to conduct each type of
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restructuring activity. Characteristics o f these restructuring methods are summarized
in Table 1.

2 .1 . E q u ity carve-outs
Equity carve-outs are initial public offerings (IPOs) o f equity in a firm ’s
wholly-owned subsidiary. These offerings parallel seasoned stock o r conventional
initial public offerings since they generate cash for the parent firm through a public
sale o f residual claims to relevant assets. In particular, equity carve-outs create
publicly traded equity that has a claim only on a division’s cash flows. This provides
a means o f having these cash flows independently priced by the m arket. This type of
equity sale generally involves a firm commitment contract with an investment banker
who agrees to purchase the equity and resell the claims to the public. The parent o f a
carved-out subsidiary may retain either a controlling or a minority interest in the
carved-out subsidiary, but generally, the parent maintains a controlling interest so the
subsidiary gains relatively little increased autonomy. As a result o f this relationship
with the parent, the subsidiary is exposed to less financial risk than it would face as a
"stand alone" entity.
Schipper and Smith [1986] report that parent firms announcing the intent to
carve-out a subsidiary experience a positive and significant stock price reaction o f
approximately 2% on average. Thus, the market views an equity carve-out as a
favorable event. This contrasts with the average stock price decline o f 3 % when a
firm announces a seasoned equity offer. Parents maintained at least 50 percent
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Table 1
Characteristics o f Restructuring Mechanisms
Characteristic

Carve-out

Spin-off

Sell-off

N ew publicly
traded entity

Yes

Yes

No

Cash inflow

Yes

No

Yes

Security issued

Equity

None

N one

Forum

Public

Public

Private

External
Certification

Investment
bank

None

N one

Price
Determ ination

Investment
bank

M arket

Negotiated

Shareholders

New-Public
(Minority)

Unchanged

New owners

M anagerial
Rights

Parent

U nit’s managers

Purchaser

Asset base

Unchanged/
Increases

Decreases

Unchanged/
Decreases
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control in 89 percent o f the cases, indicating that generally, a carve-out cannot be
viewed as a change in control. Schipper and Smith also report that the proceeds from
carve-outs range from $300,000 to over $112 million, which translates into 0.3
percent to 69 percent o f parent equity value, with a median value o f 8 percent. Thus,
equity carve-outs are generally large equity issues. In 64 o f the 72 cases (89 percent)
examined by Schipper and Smith, the parent firm retained over 50 percent o f the
equity o f the carved-out subsidiary. F or the carved-out subsidiaries in their sample
with available data, the average initial return on the offering day is 1.7 percent
(excluding one outlier with an initial return o f 133 percent). This small degree o f
average underpricing contrasts with that o f conventional IPOs reported by Ritter
[1984] (26.5 percent) and Ibbotson [1975] (11.4 percent). This suggests that equity
carve-outs are not characterized by the same degree o f asymmetric information as
conventional IPOs even though both methods of issuing equity are subject to identical
Securities and Exchanges Commission requirements.
The issuance o f publicly traded equity in a carved-out subsidiary is governed
by the Securities Act o f 1933 which requires issuers o f securities to fully disclose all
material inform ation regarding a security, its backers, and its intended use to
prospective investors prior to the sale o f the securities. Disclosure compliance is
accomplished through filing a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). This statement contains two parts, the prospectus - a summary of
the longer registration statement submitted to the SEC which is designed to help
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investors evaluate the security - and a second section (items-and-answers) containing
detailed information addressing inquiries raised by the SEC.
In general, the registration statement is intended to provide prospective
investors with the following information: the security issuer’s properties and
businesses, significant provisions o f the security to be offered for sale and their
relationship to the offeror’s other securities, background information about
management and the current status o f the offeror, and financial statements certified by
independent public accountants. Registration statements become effective on the 20th
day after filing is complete. However, the SEC may advance or delay the effective
date if it deems such action to be in the interest o f investors and the public.
The SEC issued additional requirements for firms wishing to carve-out
subsidiaries in 1985. To prevent profits from being overstated, subsidiaries must
subtract all general, selling and administrative expenses from their own earnings to
prevent "hiding" these expenses in the parent’s accounting statements. T he SEC also
requires that any goodwill created from the previous purchase o f a subsidiary to be
carried on the subsidiary’s books. These accounting changes must be reflected in the
prospectus before it is distributed.
Dow Jones News W ire (DJNW) and W all Street Journal (WSJ) announcements
o f equity carve-outs typically include information related to the num ber o f shares to
be sold, the expected offer price range, the firm ’s investment banker, the ownership
stake retained by the parent, the use o f proceeds, and the prim ary activities o f the
subsidiary.
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The following announcement o f the intent o f Banner Industries to carve out
Banner Aerospace released over the DJNW is typical o f equity carve-out
announcements:
W ashington - Banner Aerospace Inc., a unit o f Banner Industries Inc., filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for an initial offering o f 9.5
million common shares. After the offering, Banner Aerospace will have 18
million shares outstanding. The sale o f the shares would reduce Banner
Industries’ stake in Banner Aerospace to 47.2 pc from 100 pc. It is currently
estimated that the initial price o f the stock will be in the range o f $16 to $18
per share, the filing said. Salomon Brothers Inc. and M errill Lynch Capital
M arkets will underwrite the offering, (dated 05/16/90, tim e stamped 3:21 pm)
Below is the WSJ article reporting Banner Inds. In c .’s intent to carve out
Banner Aerospace which was published the subsequent day.
Cleveland - Banner Industries Inc. said it is considering an initial public
offering o f common stock o f its Banner Aerospace Inc. unit. Banner
said it filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in connection with the proposed sale o f 9.5 million shares.
The com pany said it granted the underwriters an option to purchase an
additional 1,425,000 shares to cover overallotm ents. Salom on Brothers
Inc. and M errill Lynch Capital markets, a unit o f M errill Lynch C o.,
are the underwriters. As a result o f the offering, Banner Industries’
beneficial ownership o f the common stock o f Banner Aerospace will be
reduced to 47.2% from 100% and to 39.3% if the overallotm ent option
is exercised in full. Banner said completion o f the offering is subject to
market conditions. In M arch, Banner said it was considering shedding
nonmanufacturing business, including its waste water treatment group
and its aerospace distribution group. Lately, the com pany has been
trying to raise capital for acquisitions more closely related to its
manufacturing focus. Banner Aerospace distributes new and overhauled
aviation replacement parts, including fasteners, avionics, bearings and
electrical and airfram e parts.
Schipper and Smith [1986] view an equity carve-out as a hybrid transaction
that shares characteristics with both a seasoned equity issue and a spin-off. Equity
carve-outs resem ble seasoned equity offers because each is a form o f external
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financing that entails an equity issue, although the share price reaction is dramatically
different. Carve-outs are compared to spin-offs because both o f these transactions
provide the firm with an opportunity to revise compensation contracts for subsidiary
management to better align these m anagers’ incentives with those o f the relevant
shareholders. F o r example, stock options can be linked to subsidiary stock prices and
profitability measures, rather than to those o f the parent, to directly rew ard subsidiary
managers for effort and perform ance related to the subsidiary. In addition, both
carve-outs and spin-offs are associated with the initiation o f public trading o f equity
claim s on subsidiary assets and a perm anent increase in public disclosure o f subsidiary
inform ation. Thus, the new public entities become subject to increased inform ation
collection and monitoring by outside investors, and monitoring by public markets,
analysts and rating agencies.
This study develops a third comparison by viewing carve-outs as closely
related to IPOs. Generally, both equity carve-outs and IPOs are associated with
severe asym m etric information problems due to the lack o f publicly available
information and history o f the relevant unit. Like IPOs, managers intending to issue
equity claims on a wholly-owned subsidiary determine the am ount o f equity to be
issued and the tim e o f the public sale. Thus, the market for equity carve-outs and
IPOs may suffer from problems related to adverse selection and moral hazard. The
extensive IPO literature will be used later in this dissertation to draw further parallels
between motivations for equity carve-outs and motivations for IPOs.
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2.2. Spin-offs
Spin-offs are initiated via a pro rata stock dividend (usually tax-free) to
existing shareholders. This method o f corporate restructuring involves neither
external financing nor third party agents. Instead, the consolidated firm is divided by
managerial decision, subject to shareholder approval, into two (or more) firms with an
identical set o f shareholders. Unlike an equity carve-out or an asset sell-off, a spin
o ff reduces the asset base o f the parent firm. Similar to a sell-off, but unlike a carveout, the parent cedes the right to manage the assets o f the spun-off subsidiary.
N evertheless, spin-offs involve considerable managerial continuity because the assets
will be managed solely by the division’s current management team, independent o f
parent firm management. Unlike a carve-out, the "stand alone" entity created by a
spin-off is free from the parent’s control and completely separated from the parent’s
resources. Nevertheless, even though the subsidiary is adm inistratively and
financially independent, the parent and subsidiary may maintain business relations
(e.g. supplier and customer) if their respective activities are related.
Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and Owers [1983] and Miles and Rosenfeld
[1983] report positive and significant stock price reactions o f 2% to 4% for firms
announcing an intent to spin-off a subsidiary(s). Schipper and Smith indicate that the
parent and the spun-off subsidiary belong to different industry classifications over 77
percent o f the time. H ite and Owers indicate that the average value o f spin-offs in
their sample is 6.6 percent o f the original equity value o f the consolidated firm.
M iles and Rosenfeld report that the announcement stock price reaction in their sample
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is a positive function o f the size o f the spin-off. These authors interpret positive stock
price reactions as being consistent with two explanations (aside from regulatory
considerations). First, gains may arise from increased managerial efficiency o f the
subsidiary’s assets. The efficiency increase may be achieved via im provem ent o f the
subsidiary managers’ incentive contracts by tying managerial compensation to the
perform ance o f the subsidiary o r by eliminating negative synergies that may occur
within a firm with diverse operating units. Second, the announcement gains may be
associated with a permanent increase o f information flows about the subsidiary to, and
enhanced monitoring by, public markets and related external monitors. Following the
spin-off, the new publicly traded firm ’s perform ance is reported via its own set o f
financial statements rather than being submerged in the parent’s perform ance in
consolidated financial statements.
As with an equity carve-out, creation o f new, publicly traded claims via a spin
o ff requires extensive public disclosure. Prior to 1969, spin-offs were not regulated
because the SEC considered them to be dividends, not security sales. Therefore,
spin-offs were not deemed to be subject to the registration requirements established in
the Securities Act of 1933. However, allegations that spin-offs were used to avoid
disclosure requirements for "going public" transactions resulted in the SEC ’s creating
new filing requirements in 1969 and 1970 (Releases 4982 and 8909 respectively).
Thus, since that time, the SEC has viewed spin-offs as a type o f security issuance
even though there is no sale o f securities.
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Currently, the SEC requires the following actions prior to the distribution o f
equity in a new firm that is be created through a spin-off. First, an agreement
between the parent and subsidiary regarding the details o f the spin-off must be
established. This is known as the plan o f reorganization and contains details o f the
mechanics o f the spin-off. Included in this plan are: the relationship o f the parent and
subsidiary during the period prior to and subsequent to the spin-off, asset/liability
exchanges, the num ber o f shares o f stock to be distributed, record and paym ent dates
for distribution, whether the new stock is to be listed on an exchange, and revisions o f
stock options, employee stock ownership plans and pensions plans. Second, a proxy
statement must accompany the notice for the shareholders meeting at which the
reorganization plan will be approved. Finally, a registration statement is submitted to
the SEC with an accompanying prospectus. M ost o f the items in the proxy statement
are also contained in the registration statement. The prospectus must be distributed to
all shareholders receiving stock in the spin-off.
U nder Section 355 o f the Internal Revenue Code, the pro rata distribution o f
the equity in the subsidiary is tax-free if the following five criteria are met. One, the
purpose o f the spin-off must be germ ane to the corporations’ business activities (e.g.,
to separate a business to allow its employees to participate in profit sharing). Two,
the parent and the subsidiary must be engaged in business for at least five years
preceding the spin-off. Three, the parent must own at least 80 percent o f the
subsidiary stock and distribute all o f its holdings in the subsidiary to shareholders.
Four, no pre-arranged plan for shareholders to sell the subsidiary stock subsequent to
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the spin-off may exist (continuity o f interest). Five, the transaction cannot be used
prim arily as a device for distributing the earnings or profits o f either the parent or
subsidiary.
Typically, DJNW announcem ents o f planned spin-offs include information
related to the pro rata distribution o f shares, the tax treatment o f the restructuring and
the operation(s) that will separated from the parent. Occasionally, additional
information is provided including the reason for the spin-off (e.g. the m arket will be
able to value the separate entities m ore precisely), past earnings information, recent
stock price movements, and cursory industry analysis. Below is an exam ple o f a
D JNW spin-off announcement:
Acton M ass - Acton Corp. said its board approved a plan to spin off
the com pany’s food operations into Acton Food Corp. at the end o f the
year. Acton Corp will continue to run its communications operations.
Acton Corp said one common share o f Acton Food will be issued for
each share o f Acton C orp.. Acton Corp said one Acton Food Corp.
warrant will be issued for each Acton Corp. warrant, (dated 09/22/81,
tim e stamped 10:24 am)
The WSJ article following the DJNW announcement generally contains similar
information, but in m ore detail. F or example, the following WSJ article for the
Acton Corp. spin-off was published the subsequent day:
Acton M ass - Acton Corp. said its board approved a plan to spin off
the com pany’s food operations into a separate company at year-end.
Acton Corp. which previously had disclosed its intentions to m ake the
spinoff, will continue to operate its communications business, which
includes 45 cable television systems, a telephone interconnect company,
a telephone equipm ent manufacturing company and a broadcast
division. The company said one share o f stock in the new concern will
be issued for each share o f Acton Corp. held. F o r each Acton Corp.
warrant held, a w arrant in the new company will be issued, the
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company added. The new food company will include a snack food
manufacturing group, a service group and a egg farm.
This announcement o f Acton C orporation’s spin-off illustrates the diverse
business activities currently under its management. The announcement indicates that
the firm is to be split into two broad economic activities: broadcasting and
communications, and food production and distribution. In this case, the motivation
for the restructuring is not given. Incentives to separate Acton C orp’s assets may be
the result o f diseconomies in managing disparate business activities. Because a spin
o ff is accompanied by increased disclosure o f information about the subsidiary,
managers may be attempting to capture unrecognized value for current shareholders
by informing financial markets o f the perceived higher value o f the firms assets
without changing the residual claims on the assets.

2.3. Asset sell-offs
Asset sell-offs include the sale o f product lines, divisions, and subsidiaries to
third parties through negotiated contracts. Unlike equity carve-outs and spin-offs, the
typical sell-off does not create a new entity because the seller and buyer are usually
existing, operating firms. However, some sell-offs involve leveraged purchases o f a
division by its management (management buyout) and/or other private investors
(leveraged buyouts). Asset sales generate cash inflows to the parent firm and thus can
be viewed as a form o f external financing as well as a mechanism for transferring the
right to manage assets from the seller’s management team to the buyer’s. The buyer
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determines whether to retain the division’s current managers or to replace them with a
new team o f managers.
Sell-offs, unlike spin-offs, do not intrinsically decrease a firm ’s asset base;
instead, they transform part o f the firm ’s illiquid assets into liquid assets that can be
used to purchase other operating assets, reduce debt, or to disburse funds to
shareholders through share repurchases or special dividends. Typically sell-offs are
privately negotiated and, much like bank loans o r other privately placed securities,
involve little information disclosure relative to the issuance o f publicly traded
securities. Investment bankers are usually employed to facilitate the sell-off
transaction and maintain confidentiality, through biparty negotiations or a private
auction. On rare occasions the asset will be sold through a public auction. As in the
case o f acquisitions o f publicly traded companies, buyers generally expend
considerable resources to determine the value o f the asset in question before agreeing
to purchase it. Unlike the purchase o f an entire firm, however, no market price o f a
subsidiary is available to reflect the m arket’s prior assessment of its value.
Typically, a successful (i.e., ultimately completed) sell-off indicates that the
bidder is willing to pay an amount at least as great as the seller’s assessment o f the
asset’s value. This suggests the buyer has some favorable inform ation regarding the
asset’s value not known to the seller or the market. Recent empirical studies by
Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer [1984], Jain [1985] and H ite, Owers, and Rogers
[1987] indicate that sell-off announcements are associated with positive and significant
average stock price reactions of 1 %- 2 % for shareholders o f the selling firm s.
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Positive share price reactions to selling firms from announcements o f sell-offs are
interpreted as evidence that these transactions are associated with the movement o f
assets to higher valued uses.
The SEC requires corporations to report any material events or corporate
changes that are o f importance to investors or security holders that have not been
previously reported. This is accomplished by filing a Form 8-K. Frequently, a sello ff will induce firm s to comply with this requirem ent and submit a Form 8-K. In the
case o f an exchange o f a material asset, the SEC requires that firms (sellers and
purchasers) disclose: 1) the date o f the sale and a brief description o f the assets
involved, 2) the nature and amount o f consideration given or received for the assets,
3) identity o f other parties involved in the transaction, 4) the nature o f any material
relationship between transaction participants. The acquirer must meet two additional
requirements: 1) identify the source o f funds used, excluding ordinary bank loans if
confidentiality criteria have been met, and 2) state the nature o f the business in which
the assets were employed and declare whether or not the assets will be used for the
same purposes. If new uses are intended, they should be reported.
F o r most sell-offs, only general characteristics o f the transaction are released
to the public such as: which assets are being sold, the nam e o f the buyer, the
transaction price, and the method o f payment. A sell-off announcement may also
contain information related to the seller’s (buyer’s) motivation for disposing o f
(purchasing) the assets, the seller’s and/or the subsidiary’s latest earnings and sales,
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and some analysis on the related industries. The following example is typical o f selloff announcements found in the W all Street Journal:
N ew York - NL industries Inc. said it will purchase Sun C o .’s, oil field
services subsidiary, Sperry-Sun Inc., for $252.3 million. Sperry-Sun,
which supplies drilling products and services for the oil and gas
industry, had sales o f about $100 million and profit o f m ore than $10
million in 1980. Sales and earnings increased at a com pound annual
rate of over 30% . Sperry-Sun has plants in Sugarland, Texas;
Lafayette, L a., and Cheltenham, England. N L is a m ajor petroleum
services, chemicals and metals company. Annual sales at N L ’s
petroleum services division are about $1.2 billion, and its purchase o f
Sperry-Sun "underscores N L ’s commitment" to oil services, said Ray
C. Adam, chairman o f NL. Sperry-Sun marks N L ’s entry into the
"directional drilling market" he said. Sun’s chairman and president,
Theodore A Burtis, said Sperry-Sun is " more compatible with N L
future interests." "There is a concern that "an oil field services
company is less attractive to its customers - oil companies - when it is
owned by another oil com pany," M r. Burtis added. Sun is based in
Radnor, P a..
This announcement indicates that the seller, Sun C o., is disposing o f its oil
field services assets because it believes that it no longer possesses a com parative
advantage in that industry. Thus, although Sperry-Sun is still profitable, the nature o f
its parent’s operations prevent it from reaching its perceived potential. Disposing o f
Sperry-Sun will presumably allow Sun Co. to become a more focused com petitor in
the refining and distribution sectors o f the oil industry. Sperry-Sun is being purchased
by NL Industries which has expressed a commitment to maintaining the
competitiveness o f its petroleum services division. NL Industries’ anticipated gains
from this transaction may result from economies o f scale or scope. Implicitly, NL
Industries’ decision to enter the directional drilling market through the purchase o f
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Sperry-Sun indicates that management believes it is less expensive for them to acquire
an existing company than to develop the business with their existing assets.

2.4. Voluntary liquidations
Voluntary liquidations are an extreme form o f asset sell-off. Rather than
selling an individual piece o f the firm , managers sell all o f the pieces in multiple
transactions and distribute the proceeds to shareholders through special dividends.
This form o f corporate restructuring indicates that the organizational capital o f the
firm has dissipated and is less a form o f restructuring than an auction o f the entire
firm in piecemeal form. This method o f asset disposition is in contrast to a control
transaction in which the entire firm is sold intact. Em pirical analyses by Hite, Owers,
and Rogers [1987] and Skantz and Marchesini [1987,1988] indicate that
announcements o f voluntary liquidations are associated with a 12 percent to 14 percent
increase in share price. Hite, Owers, and Rogers and Kim and Schatzberg report
relatively small median market values o f equity o f $41 million and $23 million
respectively for their samples o f liquidations. Strongly positive and significant stock
price reactions to announcements o f liquidation are documented by Hite, Owers, and
Rogers, who find average two-day announcement returns o f 12.24% , and Kim and
Schatzberg who report a three-day announcement return o f 14%. Skantz and
M archesini report an announcement month return o f 21.4% .
A prim ary source o f the positive announcement gains may be the anticipation
o f an auction with m ultiple bidders. Another possible source o f gains is favorable tax
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treatment o f any capital gains. Voluntary liquidations, unlike liquidations that occur
as part o f bankruptcy proceedings, have the positive motivation that managers feel that
the firm is more valuable to shareholders by being dismantled and auctioned o ff than
it is as an on-going concern. In addition, a voluntary liquidation gives managers
considerable control over the process by which the firm ’s assets are to be sold so as to
enhance shareholder value. In contrast, in a bankruptcy liquidation, the court
appoints a trustee who is responsible for terminating the firm ’s operations and
disposing o f the firm ’s assets.

2.5. Joint ventures
A joint venture is a complex form o f corporate restructuring that involves a
continuing relationship with another firm. Creation o f a new legal entity via a joint
venture may be viewed as a partial merger, while the sale o f a share o f an existing
jo in t venture may be viewed as a divestiture. In either case, the partners exist as
separate firms apart from the joint venture. Joint ventures may exist as partnerships,
corporations, or any o f several other legal forms o f organization. Joint ventures are
typically o f limited scope and duration. Each partner contributes something to the
venture that enhances the other participants’ investment, but, the sharing o f
inform ation and/or assets between participants is limited to the scope o f the joint
venture. McConnell and Nantell [1985] show that on average, there are positive and
significant share price reactions o f approximately 0.73% for firms participating in
joint ventures.
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There exists a wide range o f motives for joint ventures. F o r example, a firm
with a product idea whose outcome is highly uncertain and whose expected payoff
may not be realized for several years may seek a partner with sufficient cash flow to
invest in development o f the idea. Frequently, transfer o f knowledge is a major
factor in creating jo in t ventures. This is often th e case when the knowledge to be
shared is very com plex o r technical in nature. A jo in t venture can also serve as a
method o f reducing cash outlays and sharing risk in developing new technologies and
markets. Creation o f a new entity via a joint venture can also be means o f avoiding
legal liability while developing new products. Finally, antitrust authorities may be
more willing to perm it joint ventures rather than m ergers because a joint venture
increases the num ber o f firms in an industry while a m erger may reduce the number
o f firms.

3. Summary
General economic welfare is enhanced by the existence o f a market for
corporate control that creates the discipline to induce managers to combine corporate
resources into m ore profitable organizations. An extensive literature documents that
gains are created from m erger and acquisition activity. Substantial evidence indicates
that, on average, shareholders o f target firms experience significant wealth increases,
although the evidence on gains to shareholders o f acquiring firms is more ambiguous.
There also exists considerable evidence that the dismantling o f complex corporate
organizations enhances shareholder wealth.
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Announcements o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and asset sell-offs are each
associated with positive stock price reactions, even though each differs as a form o f
external financing and securities issuance and has a unique impact on the control o f
the assets in question. An equity carve-out is the sale to outside investors o f residual
claims on a subsidiary’s assets that typically remain under the control o f the parent.
A spin-off creates a new publicly traded entity that is administratively and financially
independent o f its parent, via a pro rata dividend to existing shareholders without any
new external financing. Like an equity carve-out, but unlike a spin-off, a sell-off is a
form o f external financing. Unlike a spin-off, no stand alone entity is created because
control o f the division or subsidiary is generally transferred from one management
team to the management team o f an existing, operating firm via a private transaction.
T he focus o f this dissertation is to test the relevance o f motives associated with
various types o f corporate restructuring by viewing these transactions within the
context o f the securities issuance literature and related work on financing decisions.
Intra-industry share price effects o f restructuring decisions, viewed within the
fram ework o f models o f securities issuance, will provide a means for testing the
relevance o f three hypotheses that have been developed to explain managem ent’s
decision to restructure: the asymmetric information hypothesis, the efficiency
hypothesis, and agency cost arguments.
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Chapter 3
M ajor Hypotheses for Restructuring

1. Introduction
Previous literature on economic reorganization contains several alternative
theories as explanations for the motivation behind corporate restructuring and asset
disposition. Several o f these alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and it
is difficult to discrim inate among them based on existing empirical evidence, which
focuses predominately on share price reactions to announcing firms. In general
previous empirical studies indicate that each form o f restructuring (equity carve-out,
spin-off, and asset sell-off) is, on average, a wealth enhancing event.
Schipper and Smith [1986] posit that the positive returns from equity carveouts may result from: (1) increased disclosure o f information related to the
subsidiary’s activities and profitability, (2) improved efficiency in asset management
that is the result o f changes in management compensation contracts, and (3)
preventing subsidiary management from having to forego positive net present value
projects by separating the parent’s and the subsidiary’s external financing
opportunities. This argum ent is based on predictions stemming from M yers and
M ajluf’s [1984] model of security issuance (that will b e discussed in detail later)
which argues that managers may forego positive net present value projects to avoid
the negative information effects associated with seasoned equity issues (if no
alternative funding source is available). Schipper and Smith conclude that each of
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these explanations may account for the 2% increase in parent firm shareholder value
that is observed in response to equity carve-out announcements.
Schipper and Smith [1983], H ite and Owers [1983], and M iles and Rosenfeld
[1983] hypothesize that the positive returns to spin-offs may be explained by: (1) a
perm anent increase in information disclosure about the subsidiary and the parent, (2)
elimination o f diminishing returns to management through increased specialization by
the parent and the spun-off subsidiary that enhances shareholder value, (3) resolution
o f agency problems, (4) overcoming regulatory, tax, and bond covenant constraints,
(5) bondholder wealth expropriation and (6) facilitating opportunities fo r takeover
bids.
O f these theories, only the bondholder wealth expropriation hypothesis is
inconsistent with existing empirical evidence. In particular, Schipper and Smith and
H ite and Owers demonstrate that neither bond prices nor bond ratings show
statistically significant reactions to announcements o f spin-offs. Due to the small
num ber o f parent firms that spin o ff subsidiaries because o f regulatory considerations
and the even smaller num ber o f cases in which a spin-off leads to a takeover o f either
the parent or the subsidiary, it is difficult to generate definitive evidence about these
considerations as explanations for the positive share price reaction to spin-off
announcements. In particular, they are unlikely to be important motivations for
restructuring via a spin-off in general, although they may be reasonable explanations
for some specific restructurings.
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H ite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] argue that efficiency considerations are the
major source o f positive returns to firms announcing sell-offs. They reach this
conclusion because their results show that only firms that are able to complete an
announced asset sale experience a permanent positive share price revision. F or firms
announcing a sell-off that is not brought to completion, the positive announcement
effects eventually dissipate. This is consistent with the fact that efficiency gains are
only realized when buyers with higher valued economic uses for the assets are able to
purchase them from sellers with relatively lower valued economic uses. Hite, Owers
and Rogers conclude that dissipation o f the announcement reaction for firms not
completing a sell-off is inconsistent with the hypothesis that inform ation effects are the
source o f the announcement gains.
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] find positive returns only for firm s that pay
out proceeds from asset sales to bondholders (they found no examples o f payouts to
shareholders). Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz argue that sell-offs may potentially
exacerbate agency problem s if there is retention o f large free cash flows within the
firm. They find that there are statistically insignificant returns to sellers who retain
the proceeds within the firm , a result that they argue is inconsistent with efficiency
arguments advanced by Hite, Owers, and Rogers.
This dissertation considers the three hypotheses that have become the dominant
alternative explanations for restructuring activities: (1) the economic efficiency
hypothesis, (2) the asymmetric information hypothesis, and (3) the agency cost
hypothesis. Analysis o f intra-industry valuation effects, found in the finance and
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accounting literatures and discussed later, will be used to test the applicability o f the
three hypotheses as explanations o f the various forms o f corporate restructuring.
Announcement returns o f intra-industry rivals aid in testing the validity o f the
hypotheses because the predicted reaction for industry rivals is different for each
hypothesis. These predictions are discussed in detail below.

2. The efficiency hypothesis
The gains from corporate restructuring decisions are often attributed to
capturing potential efficiency gains obtained by moving assets to higher valued uses.
T he efficiency hypothesis is based on the assumption that there are differential
m anagerial skills and com parative advantages of different corporate entities or that
there are im portant economies o f scale and scope. This hypothesis predicts both
private and social gains when assets are moved to higher valued uses. Economic
gains from restructuring may arise if current managers are induced to operate the
assets in question m ore efficiently. Schipper and Smith [1983,1986] argue that
efficiency gains may be achieved by dividing the firm for two separate, but related
reasons. First, there may be diseconomies o f scale in management which dissipate
economic gains that would otherwise be obtainable through separation o f disparate
productive activities. F or example, diversity o f transactions due to dissimilar
activities of the parent and subsidiary may give rise to diseconomies. The costs o f
decision making, which involve distributing investment-facilitating inform ation, may
also offset any economies o f scale o r scope in production as firm complexity grows.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

The second potential cause o f diseconomies in management given by Schipper
and Smith is the cost o f evaluating and rewarding managerial performance. Enhanced
asset management may be achieved by reorganizing management’s responsibilities and
incentives. Creating a "stand alone" entity through a corporate restructuring may be
useful in prom oting top level managers, attracting new, competent managers, and
strengthening managerial incentives. F or example, promoting a productive top level
m anager from within the parent firm to the post of C hief Executive Officer o f a newly
created "stand alone" firm may be a form o f compensation that encourages continued
profitable decision making and effort. The new C hief Executive Officer post may
also be used to attract talented managers outside o f the parent firm and thus augm ent
or strengthen the management o f the assets o f the new entity. Asset management
efficiency can also be improved by incorporating subsidiary share prices as a market
based measure o f their perform ance in incentive contracts rather than the use o f parent
firm prices or profits o r subsidiary accounting data. Subsidiary management can then
be rewarded with stock options or other forms o f compensation based more directly
on their decisions and effort, rather than the perform ance o f the parent as a whole.
In their studies o f equity carve-outs and spin-offs, Schipper and Smith report
that subsidiary managers are frequently offered new compensation contracts
subsequent to the event. Almost without exception these contracts include stock
options based on the subsidiary’s stock price and performance. Thus, a corporate
restructuring decision that results in a new publicly traded entity may be an im portant
method o f improving the management o f subsidiary assets. In contrast, stimulating
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productive gains through the revision o f compensation contracts based on market
prices is not possible in the case o f a sell-off because no new publicly traded firm
results from such a restructuring.
Another means to achieve improved operational efficiency is to transfer the
right to control the assets to a new management team that is able to employ the assets
m ore profitably. The comparative advantage possessed by the new managers may
stem from potential economies o f scale or scope in their current asset organization or
may be due to the fact that the new managers are more competent in managing those
assets.
Economies o f scale occur because o f the indivisibility o f certain assets people, equipment, and overhead. This encourages horizontal asset transfers, that is,
asset transfer within an industry. Spreading the cost o f the indivisible assets over a
larger number o f units o f output increases the returns to those assets. Therefore, if
economies o f scale exist within an industry, asset utilization will be improved by
moving resources from industry members who are operating at lower levels o f output
to members who can more readily capture the gains from economies o f scale.
Economies o f scope may arise due to the difficulty in writing, executing, and
policing contracts, and are conducive to vertical integration. Combining assets related
by a common productive activity, but employed at different stages o f the process, may
reduce the cost o f the process. Costs o f communication, bargaining, advertising,
transportation, payment collections, and production coordination may be reduced if a
process is controlled by a single management team rather than competing management
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teams. The uncertainty over input supply may also be reduced through backward
integration while distribution quality can be controlled by forward integration. In
sum, reconciliation o f divergent interests o f parties to a contract is achieved through
common ownership, which decreases costs related to contracting.
Because economies o f scale and scope are only obtainable by combining assets,
a sell-off is the only form o f restructuring that can directly create efficiency gains in
this manner. Both equity carve-outs and spin-offs produce stand alone entities that are
not combined with the assets o f other firms. O f course it is possible that subsequent
to a spin-off, the new firm may be taken over by a firm that has the potential to
realize economies to scale or scope by combining the assets o f the carved-out or spunoff subsidiary with its own operations. If the market anticipates such a takeover, then
these economies would be capitalized at the initial spin-off announcement.
A firm may lose its comparative advantage in an industry due to a material
change in product m arkets, manufacturing technologies, or competition. As a result,
a division or subsidiary may no longer be an efficient component o f the firm ’s
operations and therefore it is rational for managers to sell it to outsiders who have a
comparative advantage in managing those assets and can achieve productive gains
from its acquisition.

2.1. Intra-industry effects
Increasing the efficiency o f asset utilization creates social gains through
enhanced allocation o f resources. There are private gains to the owners o f the
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resources if rents accrue from improving the com petitive position o f the firm within
an industry. Such gains accrue to m ore competitive firms presumably at the expense
o f the less competitive intra-industry rivals. F or example, the increase in profitability
may com e as a result o f achieving low-cost producer status in a com petitive market or
by creating a monopolistic position within the industry through horizontal asset
purchases. Either scenario indicates that the intra-industry rivals will face tougher
competition and presum ably lose future cash flows. Thus, gains to the firm s involved
in the restructuring come at the expense o f competitors. Therefore, the efficiency
hypothesis implies that restructuring decisions should have a negative im pact on rival
firms unless the industry is perfectly competitive.
Potentially offsetting the gains related to increased efficiency is the fact that
restructuring decisions may sometimes have the effect o f decreasing the num ber o f
independent producers o f a product. As the num ber o f firms within an industry
decreases, the opportunity to collude increases and may result in an oligopoly.
Therefore, there may also be intra-industry effects attributable to increases in market
pow er through enhanced opportunities for collusion as well as improved efficiency
effects. If collusive activity is expected to be fostered by a consolidation o f
operations, share prices o f rival firm s should be revalued upward to reflect the
expected increase in profits.
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3. The asymmetric information hypothesis
The asymmetric information hypothesis posits that managers (insiders) have
valuable information about the value o f firm assets and future cash flows and reveal
this private information (favorable or unfavorable) by the nature o f the corporate
decisions they publicly announce. Arguments based on asymmetric information are
usually developed within the context o f signalling models, first developed by Spence
[1973, 1974] in the labor economics literature and later introduced to finance by Ross
[1977].
R oss’s model o f capital structure implies that changes in financial leverage
convey information to financial markets about m anager’s expectations of the firm ’s
future profitability. F o r example, an increase in leverage may indicate that managers
perceive future cash flows as being sufficiently high to safely bond themselves to
higher future interest payments related to the increased indebtedness. A decrease in
leverage may have an opposite interpretation, that is, managers may feel future cash
flows will be insufficient to cover future interest obligations and therefore reduce
those obligations to m ore appropriate levels, thus diminishing the probability of
financial distress. Sim ilar arguments have been developed in dividend models by
Bhattacharya [1979], Hakansson [1982], and M iller and Rock [1985], These models
interpret an increase in dividend payout by a firm as a signal that the firm has
expected future cash flows sufficiently large to meet debt payments, dividend
payments, and investment needs without increasing the probability o f bankruptcy.
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The typical positive and significant stock price reaction to the announcement of
an initiation o r increase in dividends (Aharony and Swary [1980], Asquith and
M ullins [1983,1986], and Healy and Palepu [1988]) or a firm repurchasing its own
equity (Masulis [1980], Dann [1981] and Vermaelen [1981]) is interpreted as support
for the argument that the market perceives dividend initiations and increases and share
repurchases as signals o f favorable inform ation regarding the firm ’s future prospects.

3.1. Asymmetric information and takeover bids
The asymmetric information hypothesis also extends to bidders in takeover
transactions. Given imperfect information about potential future cash flows, share
prices may not reflect the value o f assets that have more profitable alternative uses to
potential buyers. Thus, a well-informed bidder may be prepared to pay a higher price
for assets than the price at which the current owner and the market values those
assets. Dodd and Ruback [1977] and Bradley [1980] assert that signalling is an
im portant component in the valuation effects o f tender offers. They argue that a
perm anent upward revaluation o f target equity value, even when a tender offer is
unsuccessful, indicates that the bid conveys private information to financial markets
about the value o f the target’s assets employed in alternative uses.
However, in subsequent studies Bradley, Desai, and Kim [1983,1988] observe
that a permanent revaluation o f target firms only occurs when the target’s assets are
combined with those o f another firm , whether it be the initial bidder or an ensuing
bidder. They find that the upward revision in firm value o f the targets that do not
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receive subsequent bids dissipates shortly after the failed takeover attempt. Bradley,
Desai, and Kim interpret these results as consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, that
is, gains are only permanent if assets are combined to create economies o f scale.
They conclude that a tender offer does not necessarily im ply that the target firm ’s
assets are undervalued. Similarly, Hite, Owers, and R oger [1987] dem onstrate that,
consistent with the findings for tender offers, terminated sell-off negotiations result in
the loss o f the positive announcement returns if the failed attempt is not followed by
another, eventually successful, negotiation. Thus, the evidence suggests that outside
bidders involved in takeover and sell-off transactions do not necessarily convey
private inform ation about the value o f the assets being sought.
T he hypothesis that takeover bids convey private information about target
assets is also found in the literature on going private transactions. DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Rice [1984], Lehn and Poulsen [1988], and Hite and Vetsuypens
[1988] find large premiums and abnormal announcement returns to shareholders in
response to going private bids. The large prem ium s paid by the acquirers who are
managers or other private investors rather than operating firms, are consistent with the
argument that these agents have access to private information that leads them to place
a higher value on the assets than the market does. The premium may reflect the
acquirer’s expectations o f higher cash flows or that the acquirer views the firm ’s cash
flows to be less risky than the market perceives.
Sim ilar to attempts to take control o f a firm or take it private, a sell-off
transaction unlike a carve-out or spin-off, involves an outside bidder(s) with private
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information seeking to gain control o f the division. H ite and Vetsuypens [1988] find
small but significant wealth gains to parents completing divisional management
buyouts, which is also consistent with the empirical results associated w ith going
private transactions. Since no consolidation o f operating firm s occurs in these cases,
this evidence suggests that going private transactions, involving the entire firm or only
portions o f it, convey favorable inform ation about the value o f relevant assets that is
not available in public markets.

3.2. Asymmetric information and securities issuance
The securities issuance literature is replete with signalling models based on
asym m etric information and adverse selection. Leland and Pyle [1977] argue that
entrepreneurs have better information about the expected future value o f their projects
than do outside investors when the entrepreneur is ready to take the firm public.
Because it is in the entrepreneur’s interest to invest a greater fraction o f his wealth in
successful projects, Leland and Pyle argue that the market will interpret the firm ’s
value as being positively related to the fraction o f equity retained by the entrepreneur
during the going public process.
Myers and M ajluf [1984] develop a signalling model that com bines investment
and financing decisions. This model is based on the assumptions that managers have
more accurate information about the "true" value o f the firm and any projects it might
undertake than the market does, and that managers act in the interest o f "old"
shareholders who are passive investors. M yers and M ajluf first analyze a case where
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the firm has no new projects. They show that if managers anticipate bad states, i.e.
states where assets are underperforming, it is rational for managers to issue equity in
order to m aximize shareholder value. Issuing equity is an unambiguous negative
financial signal that the market uses to assess the private information held by
managers, in this case, that the firm ’s assets are overvalued. The m arket then
revalues the value o f the firm downward.
The second case considered by M yers and M ajluf includes a positive net
present value (NPV) project. In this example, the market considers announcem ent of
the positive NPV project as good news. If the project is financed by equity, which is
bad news, the announcement of the project becomes an ambiguous signal. The
market cannot separate information about new project opportunities from the
information about the value o f the firm ’s assets in place. Separation is impossible
because project outcomes and states o f nature are correlated. As a result, an
underinvestment problem may occur if the firm chooses to forego some positive NPV
projects rather than issue equity at a price it feels is too low.
If project outcomes and states o f nature are uncorrelated, that is, if the project
has the same outcome regardless o f the state o f nature, the problem disappears.
Another means o f overcoming the problem is finding a source o f financing that is not
subject to the asymmetric information problem. M yers and M ajluf show that if the
firm uses its available liquid assets, e.g. retained earnings, then all positive NPV
projects can be undertaken without having to issue equity, which resolves the
asymmetric information and underinvestment problems.
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M yers [1984] uses the implications o f this model to develop a pecking order
theory for financing investment. The theory suggests that firms prefer retained
earnings as their prim ary source o f funds for investment. Using an internal source of
capital avoids the problems related to the ambiguous signal o f externally financing a
new positive NPV project. Debt is the optimal secondary source o f funds because
debt financing has payoffs that are less correlated with the states o f nature than equity
payoffs. Therefore, announcing debt financing for a new project conveys a less
negative signal than an announcement of equity financing for a new project. New
equity is the least preferred source o f funds. Firm s will avoid issuing new equity in
order to circumvent the problems o f having to forego positive NPV projects or issue
equity at a price they feel is too low.
M iller and Rock [1985] relate dividend and financing decisions to managerial
expectations about future cash flows in their model o f asymmetric information and
securities issuance. In M iller and Rock’s model, all external financing decisions are
interpreted as a negative signal that managers view the firm ’s future prospects
unfavorably, o r m ore specifically, that future cash flows will be inadequate to meet
the firm ’s investment and operational needs. The implications o f M iller and Rock’s
model on investment financing are dichotomous and contrast to those o f the Myers
and M ajluf model, which establishes a hierarchy for choosing a source o f funds.
Empirical studies o f public security issuance are generally consistent with the
M yers and M ajluf model. Empirical studies by Asquith and M ullins [1986],
Mikkelson and Partch [1986] and Masulis and Korwar [1986] indicate seasoned equity
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issue announcements are associated with significant stock price returns o f
approximately -3 %, which implies that managers issue equity when they have
unfavorable information about the value o f the firm. Linn and Pinegar [1986] and
Mikkelson and Partch [1986] report non-significant negative excess returns to
announcements o f preferred stock. Dann and Mikkelson [1984], Eckbo [1986], and
Mikkelson and Partch find non-significant negative excess returns to announcements
o f straight debt as well.
Restructuring decisions entail the announcement o f both a decision about the
role o f an asset in the firm ’s future operations and the choice o f a mechanism by
which a change in structure is to be accomplished. Because some o f these
mechanisms involve acquisition o f external capital, the securities issuance literature
implies that the method o f asset restructuring that is selected conveys a signal about
the value o f the relevant subsidiary and/or the parent firm ’s assets.
Transferring rights to control corporate assets through a sell-off creates cash
inflows for the parent firm and thus serves as an alternative to issuing new securities
while at the same time altering the firm ’s production opportunities. An equity carveout by its nature is a securities offering that involves the issuance of equity claims
without removing assets from the firm ’s production set. In contrast, no external
financing is involved in spin-offs since the firm is merely split up. Because the
securities issuance literature illustrates the adverse selection problem associated with
utilizing external financing in an environment in which managers have access to
inform ation about future cash flows not available to public markets, the three forms o f
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restructuring - sell-offs, carve-outs, and spin-offs - must also be viewed in the context
o f the securities issuance literature and its relation to the asym m etric information
perspective.
M ore specifically, this dissertation extends the asymmetric information
hypothesis o f securities issuance by arguing that management’s private knowledge
about asset valuation or future cash flows influences the choice o f the mechanism used
to carry out the restructuring o r divestiture o f assets. F or exam ple, assuming that
financing future investment is an integral part o f a restructuring decision so that a
spin-off is not appropriate, managers may chose to sell-off a division to a third party
rather than carve it out if they feel that the financial market would not appropriately
value the assets. In contrast, i f managers perceive the assets in question are likely to
be overvalued by the market, they will have an incentive to issue equity in the
division. If the firm does not need additional capital or if managers feel that the
m arket is undervaluing the division (i.e. managers have favorable private
inform ation), they may chose to spin-off the division, allowing gains to accrue to
current shareholders as private inform ation is eventually released to the market
through future disclosure o r the revelation o f future cash flows.
In this dissertation, em pirical tests o f the relevance o f this hypothesis are
developed conditioned on the assumption that some elements o f private managerial
information about relevant assets may be applicable to the industry as a whole. As a
result, managerial decisions about restructuring mechanisms induce the market to
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adjust prices o f comparable assets throughout the industry depending on the type o f
securities transaction intrinsic to the restructuring mechanism.

3.3. Asymmetric information and intra-industry effects
Intra-industry tests in this disseration parallel those found in the finance and
accounting literatures. Several studies report evidence that certain managerial
decisions convey industry-common information while others find evidence that
managerial decisions convey only firm-specific information. F or example, Foster
[1981] and Clinch and Sinclair [1987] find that unexpected earnings announcements
contain valuable information related to expected cash flows for other firms in the
industry. Lang and Stulz [1992] report evidence that rivals o f firms petitioning for
bankruptcy experience significant negative announcement effects. Consistent with the
asymmetric information hypothesis, Eckbo [1983] and Stillman [1983] find evidence
o f positive valuation effects for intra-industry rivals o f targets o f m erger and
acquisition activity. Furtherm ore, Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck [1991] document
positive and significant returns to intra-industry rivals for announcements o f goingprivate transactions. In contrast, there is evidence that some managerial decisions
convey only firm-specific information including H ertzel’s [1991] w ork on intra
industry effects o f share repurchases and Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek’s [1992]
finding o f no effect on rival share prices for seasoned equity issues.
If private, industry-common information about related assets is conveyed
through restructuring decisions, the market should revalue intra-industry rivals in
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response to a firm ’s decision to conduct asset disposition and the type o f mechanism
utilized. The market will systematically reprice the equity o f firms conducting closely
related activities based on expectations about the value o f private, managerial
information that is conveyed by the decision. The degree o f repricing will be related
to the degree o f informational asymmetry.

4. The agency cost hypothesis
Jensen and M eckling [1976] first drew attention to the potential loss in value to
public corporations caused by the conflict of interest between principals and agents.
Agency costs arise because wealth maximizing incentives are different for corporate
managers and suppliers o f capital. The agency cost hypothesis is based on difficulties
involved in writing (or rewriting) and enforcing contracts between managers and
bondholders, and between owners and managers, that m ight better align wealth
maximizing incentives. The former problem is known as bondholder wealth
expropriation and occurs when managers increase corporate risk to benefit
shareholders while the contracted rate o f return on existing corporate debt remains
unchanged. Since these contracts cannot be costlessly rewritten, bondholders may
face higher than contracted for risk. The latter problem is a manifestation o f moral
hazard. This type o f agency cost arises when it is costly to monitor the behavior o f
agents or when it is costly to bond agents.
Jensen [1986] contends that because managers cannot be perfectly monitored,
decisions that result in a cash inflow may increase agency costs if the cash is retained
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in the firm. Excess cash may allow corporate aggrandizement as hypothesized by
Roll [1986] o r misuse o f cash in other suboptimal investments, including those which
facilitate managerial consumption o f perquisites. Potential agency costs may also be
high because managers who face considerable firm-specific risk to their human capital
have an incentive to diversify. The motivation to diversify stems from the fact that
much o f the risk to managerial human capital is non-diversifiable. M anagers may
attem pt to reduce the risk to their human capital by pursuing projects with expected
cash flows that are independent o f one another, which is not necessarily consistent
with maximizing firm value. Shareholders will not favor this strategy because they
can costlessly diversify away non-systematic risk by holding a portfolio o f residual
claims on many firms. Thus, this divergence o f interests can be harmful to
shareholder wealth. These agency costs can be checked if managers retain only
sufficient cash to finance positive net present value (NPV) projects and release
remaining funds to shareholders. This minimizes cash resources under managem ent’s
control. In a related argument, Easterbrook [1984] suggests that dividends and share
repurchases serve as mechanisms for effective disbursement o f cash, and subject the
firm to intensive monitoring by financial markets and related external agents such as
investment bankers.
Within this context, restructuring can either reduce or exacerbate agency costs.
If managerial behavior is characterized by excessive risk aversion, aggrandizement, or
consumption o f perquisites, a divestiture can represent a possible solution for
correcting agency problems. F or example, a spin-off allows a firm to restructure and
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am eliorate agency costs without raising external capital. The new firm created by the
spin-off now stands alone, becoming a less diversified entity, and thus is subjected to
increased monitoring by capital markets. The increase in disclosure o f the new firm ’s
cash flows, further exposure to the market for managerial labor, and m ore market
oriented incentive contracts may induce managers to operate the firm ’s assets more
efficiently. In contrast, a carve-out or a sell-off generates considerable cash inflows
which may increase agency problem s by fostering corporate aggrandizement or
consumption o f perquisites.
Agency problem s are generally firm specific. Thus, if agency problem
considerations are the sole source o f changes in the announcing firm ’s equity,
resolution or intensification o f agency problems resulting from restructuring o r asset
sale decisions should only alter the value o f the announcing firm ’s equity, not the
equity o f rival firms. Therefore, explanations o f corporate restructuring based on
agency problems predict that there should be no intra-industry announcement effects.
The next three sections contain detailed reviews o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs,
and sell-offs with the emphasis on the role that each o f these mechanisms play as a
form o f external capital acquisition. This relates to the basic perspective o f this
dissertation that financing and investment decisions are an integral, but undeveloped
element o f the corporate restructuring process. A discussion o f the character o f
asymmetric information (that is, favorable or unfavorable) held by managers at the
tim e o f restructuring can provide new perspective on the incentives o f managers to
choose one method o f asset disposition over another. Although this discussion is
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largely focused on the relationship o f restructuring to the securities issuance process
and its implications for intra-industry effects o f these decisions, at various points the
contrasting implications o f the efficiency and asymmetric inform ation hypothesis are
developed.

5. Equity carve-outs
On February 7, 1983 Trans World Corporation delivered a prospectus to the
Securities and Exchange Commission detailing a proposal to sell shares o f its airline
unit, Trans W orld Airlines (TWA). The action came amid troubled times for TW A,
which had posted operating losses from 1979 to 1982. The proposal outlined Trans
W orld C orp’s intention to sell five million TW A shares to the public at an offer price
between $14 and $17 per share. Trans World Coiporation would retain 84% o f the
ownership o f the airline. Trans W orld Corporation indicated that the proceeds o f the
equity sale would be used to purchase new airplanes and for general corporate
purposes.
Trans W orld Corporation’s decision is a classic example o f a relatively
uncommon form o f securities issuance, an equity carve-out, in which a portion of a
wholly-owned subsidiary’s common stock is offered for sale to the public. An equity
carve-out is similar to a conventional initial public offering because it creates a new
and distinct set o f publicly traded equity claims on the assets o f the subsidiary. As is
typically the case, Trans World Corporation retained a controlling interest in the
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subsidiary, thus maintaining control over the subsidiary’s assets and operations, so the
subsidiary does not become an independent, "stand alone" corporation.
As initial public equity issues, both equity carve-outs and conventional IPOs
can b e presumed to be associated with a severe asymmetric information problem
relative to a bond issue or even a seasoned equity issue due to the lack o f historical
public disclosure o f accounting and other data. In addition, managers have
considerable flexibility to determ ine the proportion o f equity sold and the timing o f
each o f these public equity offers, which presumably will occur at an optimal time
with respect to the m anager’s informational advantage. Given this potential for
adverse selection problem s, the firm ’s decision to issue equity is likely to be
interpreted as an indication of unfavorable private information. W ith respect to
seasoned equity issues, this argument is supported by empirical studies which report
that there is a significant stock price reaction o f -3 % to the issuing firm.
Schipper and Smith [1986] show that the average stock price reaction to a
public firm offering equity in a subsidiary is + 2 % , contrasting sharply with the
negative and significant results for equity offerings in the parent firm . Thus, an
equity carve-out is a form o f public equity issuance that is favorably received, on
average, by the market. Schipper and Smith report that 73 percent o f their sample
were underwritten equity carve-outs. The remaining carve-outs were sold through
rights offers and exchange offers.
Schipper and Smith [1986] list several explanations for the positive reaction to
a parent firm ’s announcing carve-outs. First, the reaction may be ascribed to the
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creation o f a separation o f the financing o f parent and subsidiary activities. This
separation can create a "pure play" investment opportunity that may not already exist
in the market. F or example, when Club M editeranee carved out Club M ed, it
allowed investors the opportunity to own a firm whose only business was operating
vacation resorts. Club M ed was the only public firm o f its kind at the tim e o f the
offering. Thus, a carve-out may help complete the market by creating unique
investment opportunities, leading to a positive share price reaction. This would have
no impact on the valuation o f industry rivals who are each components o f larger
entities.
Second, the market may be reacting to increased efficiency in asset
management. Efficiency gains may be achieved by eliminating negative managerial
synergies that may exist with diverse businesses. Elimination o f diseconomies of
scale in management can be realized through improving managerial motivation by
rewriting incentive contracts to include compensation based on the stock price and
other perform ance measures o f the subsidiary rather than the parent. Given market
efficiency, m arket prices o f subsidiary stock become valuable indicators o f managerial
perform ance that can be effective in motivating managers to pursue maximization of
shareholder wealth. Consistent with this view, Schipper and Smith report that 94
percent o f their sample cases adopted incentive compensation plans based on the
subsidiary’s stock price. This is effectively an economic efficiency argument which
predicts that rival share prices should fall, assuming that the subsidiary becomes a
significantly stronger competitor.
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Improved public understanding o f a subsidiary’s growth opportunities may also
enhance equity values. Managers can foster more precise m arket valuation by
permanently increasing the amount and quality o f public inform ation about assets. In
an equity carve-out, managers bond themselves to maintain a higher, legally mandated
level o f financial reporting about the subsidiary’s activities. I f this method of
restructuring is interpreted as releasing favorable information regarding future cash
flows relative to voluntary divisional reporting, carving out a subsidiary will increase
the m arket’s perception about the value o f the subsidiary, thus increasing the value o f
the parent firm in response to the announcement. If this information is com m on to
other firm s in the same industry as the subsidiary, an equity carve-out announcement
should lead to an increase the value o f rival firms.
In contrast to Schipper and Smith, Nanda [1991] argues that the good news
associated with an equity carve-out is a securities issuance problem rather than an
efficiency phenomenon. H e models carve-outs in a M yers and M ajluf [1984] security
issuance fram ework rather than an economic efficiency fram ework. Nanda suggests
that the ability to issue equity tied to a wholly-owned subsidiary creates an additional
degree o f managerial freedom in financing subsidiary projects. In N anda’s model,
equity carve-outs will generally be chosen when managers believe a parent firm is
undervalued by the market and thus are reluctant to issue parent firm equity. Nanda
demonstrates that the option to utilize an equity carve-out allows firms to invest in
some subsidiary projects that might otherwise be waived. Although N anda’s model
does not develop the case in which a subsidiary is overvalued while the remaining

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
assets are fairly valued, presumably managers would have the same incentive to
carve-out the subsidiary in this situation.
M ore specifically, N anda’s model indicates that rational managers will
maximize firm value by choosing to issue equity in a subsidiary when their private
inform ation leads them to believe the m arket is likely to overvalue the subsidiary but
undervalues the parent firm ’s remaining assets. If the firm is overvalued as a whole,
then a standard seasoned equity issue is used. This implies that there is good news in
an equity carve-out, namely, that managers believe that consolidated firm equity is
undervalued so the carve-out announcement should induce a positive stock-price
reaction in the consolidated firm ’s equity. However, Nanda’s model also implies that
there is bad news in an equity carve-out, namely, that managers regard the subsidiary
as overvalued. If some o f the unfavorable private information released in the
announcement applies to similar industry assets, this implies that an equity carve-out
should cause a negative stock price reaction for rivals o f the subsidiary being carved
out. Likewise, if the good news in an equity carve-out is the undervaluation o f the
parent firm, then the carve-out announcement should induce positive changes in the
equity o f parent firm rivals.
The efficiency hypothesis implies that the subsidiary and possibly the parent
firm , becom e more efficient competitors that indicates that negative stock price
reactions are predicted for the rivals o f the carved-out subsidiary and possibly for the
rivals o f the parent firm. Therefore, if subsidiary rivals do experience a negative
valuation effect, the asymmetric information and the efficiency hypotheses are
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indistinguishable. However, the two hypotheses do have distinct predictions for the
rivals o f the parents. Finally, if firm specific agency considerations are responsible
for equity carve-outs, there would be no effect on industry rivals for either the
subsidiary or the parent.

6. Spin-offs
Schipper and Smith [1983] argue that spin-offs are generally similar to carveouts and thus spur economic efficiency. Unlike a carve-out, however, a spin-off
creates an entity that is financially and administratively independent o f its parent. As
in the case o f a carve-out, the new firm is subject to extensive public disclosure which
will permanently increase the quality and quantity o f information flowing to the
market by requiring that two sets o f financial reports b e permanently supplied to the
market instead o f a single consolidated report. Thus, both spin-offs and equity carveouts are forms o f restructuring that provide separate valuation o f disparate business
activities. M anagerial continuity of the subsidiary is maintained in both cases, but in
a spin-off subsidiary management becomes fully independent while in a carve-out it
still reports to the parent firm.
As with carve-outs, there are positive gains to firm s announcing spin-offs as
reported by Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and Owers [1983], and Miles and
Rosenfeld [1983]. Previous explanations for these gains have largely rested on
managerial efficiency and pure play arguments. Schipper and Smith argue that firms
can eliminate negative synergies by separating diverse business activities and thus
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im prove operational efficiency. M anagerial motivation to increase the profitability o f
subsidiary assets can be enhanced by establishing a compensation system based on
perform ance o f the subsidiary. Schipper and Smith [1983] also argue there are gains
from relaxed regulatory constraints. I f there are im portant efficiency gains to spin
offs, there should be negative effects on rivals o f the parent and o f the subsidiary.
No support was found for bondholder wealth expropriation as a source o f the
announcement gains. Specifically, Schipper and Smith and H ite and Owers report
that there are no significant changes in the bond ratings or bond prices o f the firms
spinning o ff subsidiaries. A wealth transfer induced by a spin-off is less likely if: (1)
the spun-off assets existed as a legal subsidiary prior to the transaction, (2) bond
covenants protect collateral by restricting dividends, o r (3) debt is allocated to both
the parent and the subsidiary. Schipper and Smith report that most of their sample
meets at least one o f these conditions. They indicate that approximately 75 % o f the
spin-offs were legal subsidiaries prior to the restructuring, about 65% o f the sample
firms had some kind o f dividend constraint o r requirem ent o f lender approval, and
debt was assigned to subsidiaries in 64 o f the 93 sam ple spin-offs. If spin-offs merely
represent a redistribution of wealth between bondholders and equity holders and if this
redistribution is responsible for the positive announcem ent effect, then there should be
no intra-industry effect on rivals. Similarly, if a spin-off is a means to attenuate firm
specific agency problem s, intra-industry rival equity values will remain unchanged.
From a securities issuance perspective, divesting assets through a spin-off may
release private inform ation that allows the market to favorably revalue the relevant
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equity claims on the resulting new firms. I f the spin-off announcem ent releases
information that relevant assets are undervalued, and if elements o f this information
are industry-common, then the market will revalue industry assets involved in related
activities. In general, under this hypothesis rivals with sim ilar assets should be
revalued upward by the market.
M ore specifically, there is an important difference between spin-offs and
carve-outs from a securities issuance perspective. Unlike a carve-out, a spin-off is not
form o f external financing. Thus, in a Myers and M ajluf [1984] fram ew ork a spin-off
cannot be viewed as a signal o f bad news. Although a carve-out is intrinsically an
equity issuance phenom enon, the decision by management to split the asset base o f a
consolidated firm without either issuing equity in a division or selling the asset
outright to a third party may reflect m anager’s belief that the subsidiary is
undervalued by the market. Likewise, avoidance o f an equity issue in a parent firm
that restructures may also indicate that managers regard the parent firm ’s equity as
also undervalued.
If the market assumes that managerial beliefs about this undervaluation reflect
industry-common inform ation, equity values o f rivals o f the spun-off firm (and
possibly parent rivals as well) should increase in response to an announcem ent of
restructuring via a spin-off. This prediction for rivals o f parents o f spin-offs can be
viewed as a parallel N anda’s [1991] argument for equity carve-outs. It should be
noted however, that this perspective generates different valuation predictions for rivals
o f spun-off subsidiaries versus carved-out subsidiaries. In particular, rivals o f the
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spun-off unit should sustain positive share price effects because managers are
unwilling to issue equity in the subsidiary o r sell the assets outright to a third party.
In contrast, rivals o f subsidiaries to be carved-out should have negative valuation
effects because o f the equity issuance.
T he asymmetric information hypothesis prediction o f positive stock price
reactions for rivals o f the spun-off subsidiary also provides a means for distinguishing
between securities issuance considerations and the efficiency hypothesis as
explanations for restructuring. T he efficiency hypothesis predicts negative returns to
subsidiary rivals regardless o f the method o f restructuring. Thus, the asymmetric
inform ation hypothesis predicts positive valuation effects for rivals o f spun-off
subsidiaries, in contrast to the efficiency hypothesis. Both hypotheses predict negative
valuation effects for rivals o f carved-out subsidiaries.

7. Asset sell-offs
T he most common form o f asset disposition, the sell-off, involves transferring
the rights to manage a subsidiary from one parent firm to another. Unlike a carve-out
or a spin-off, a sell-off does not intrinsically create autonomy for the subsidiary.
M uch o f the literature on asset sales focuses on the role that these transactions play in
enhancing economic efficiency or synergy, i.e ., moving resources to higher valued
uses. Nevertheless, a sell-off also involves a cash inflow to the selling firm through a
private transaction with an outside party. M iller and Rock’s [1985] model o f security
issuance implies that any form of security issuance signals bad news about the firm ’s
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future cash flow and early arguments regarding voluntary sell-offs focus on the notion
that sell-offs signal financial distress, effectively a securities issuance argument.
However, empirical studies find positive and significant stock price reactions to firms
announcing a sell-off o f 1% to 2 % percent (Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer
[1984], Linn and R ozeff [1984], and Jain [1985]). Hite, Owers and Rogers [1987]
confirm this result and report positive and significant average returns o f 0.83% to
buyers as well. They conclude that share price reactions are largely consistent with
the synergy hypothesis because o f the transitory positive revaluation announcement
effect for the firms that are unable to complete the sale o f the asset. Since the
revaluation is not permanent, it is unlikely that announcement gains are associated
with bids that convey private information indicating that the assets are undervalued by
the market.
Direct sales o f assets can be viewed as a private form o f external financing that
avoids the need to issue equity or other publicly traded instruments. In a sell-off, the
seller can give a bidder(s) access to private information about the prospects o f the
subsidiary in a way that would be otherwise difficult to do. In the case of multiple
bidders, the sell-off process effectively becomes an auction. Investment bankers can
foster an environment in which competing bidders can participate in a private auction
that is conducive to the selling firm ’s receiving the fair market price for the assets
without providing the disclosure associated with the normal public securities issuance
process.
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This privately negotiated transaction provides an alternative source o f raising
capital that allows the firm to entirely avoid a public securities offerings. Positive
returns to sell-offs are consistent with share price reactions that have been observed
for other forms o f private financing transactions, suggesting that the market responds
to private financing more favorably than equivalent public securities. W ruck [1989]
reports positive and significant returns o f 4.5% upon announcements o f privately
placed equity which is in contrast to the typical negative response o f -2% to -3%
observed for public equity issues. James [1987] reports positive returns to bank loans
and high-quality, privately placed debt. In contrast, public debt issues are typically
associated with non-positive announcement effects. Thus, stock-price reactions to
corporate financing depend not only on the type o f security issued (equity or debt),
but also on whether issuing securities involves private or public capital raising
mechanisms.
Although a sell-off intrinsically leaves the firm ’s potential asset size
unchanged, it can also be viewed as the partial liquidation o f the firm if the proceeds
are distributed to bondholders or equity holders rather than retained within the firm.
Instead o f selling all o f the pieces o f the firm as in a liquidation, managers may find it
optimal to sell only one component o f the firm . Since liquidations are piecemeal sales
o f a firm ’s entire asset base to multiple buyers in which proceeds are distributed to
shareholders through special dividends following the retirem ent o f m ore senior claims
on the assets, the literature on corporate liquidations which has emphasized the role o f
asym m etric information as a motivation for liquidation may provide insight on
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possible incentives for sell-offs. Furtherm ore, Hite, Owers and Rogers observe
positive and significant returns to senior debt securities around liquidation
announcements o f 8.57% , a result confirmed by Kim and Schatzberg. This result
indicates the beneficial effect o f liquidation on senior claimants in addition to the
positive effects on residual claims. Kim and Schatzberg hypothesize that an auction
environment with several bidders may induce the increase in market values.
Hite, Owers, and Rogers argue that liquidation announcements convey the
favorable inform ation that managers view a piecemeal sale o f the firm as generating
greater value than either the market value o f the firm as an on-going concern o r the
price obtainable from selling the firm as a whole. This hypothesis is consistent with
the relatively small firm size found in the liquidation samples. Sm aller firm s are
followed by fewer analysts and are typically younger firms with modest histories.
Thus, information asymmetry may be inversely related to firm size.
This asymmetric information view o f sell-offs is consistent with effects found
for transactions such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs).
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice [1984] and Lehn and Poulsen [1989] report strongly
significant, positive average LBO announcement effects of 22% and 20% ,
respectively. Possible sources o f these gains include (1) tax benefits, (2) increased
management incentives and reduced agency costs, (3) wealth transfer effects, (4)
efficiency considerations, and (5) asymmetric information and underpricing. W hile it
is difficult to empirically separate many of these explanations, there is considerable
support for the hypothesis that going private bids convey private asymmetric
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inform ation. F or example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice [1984] find that goingprivate bids not brought to fruition are still positive events for the target, which
suggests a permanent upward revaluation o f firm equity. Slovin, Sushka, and
Bendeck [1991] report positive and significant stock price reactions to intra-industry
rivals o f firms receiving LBO o r MBO offers.

They argue that these valuation

effects are a result o f bidders releasing industry-common information about asset
values. Because no consolidation o f operating firms occurs, these effects cannot be
attributed to synergies or monopoly power.
From an asymmetric information perspective, an acquisition o f a division
indicates that the buyer voluntarily pays a price greater than the asset’s worth to the
seller. Similar to LBOs, the decision to purchase an asset is presumably preceded by
expenditure o f resources by the buyer to determ ine the value o f the relevant assets.
This suggests that such an acquisition entails the production o f private information by
the buyer regarding the value o f relevant assets that is not available in the public
domain.

Thus, the information hypothesis implies that bidders in sell-offs reveal

positive, private information about the unit. If this information relates only to the
suboptimal operating policies o f current management or to the inefficiency o f the
firm ’s organizational structure, then the gains from an announcement that the asset is
to be sold will be firm specific. However, if the announcement reveals positive
private information about the true value o f the subsidiary’s assets and if some o f this
inform ation applies to the industry, the market would increase the value o f the equity
o f the divested unit’s rivals. Since a single buyer agrees to purchase the unit and
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there is no issuance o f equity tied to the unit, valuation effects on rivals o f the
divested unit should be m ore favorable than an equity carve-out.
Because the selling o f an asset may serve as a form o f securities issuance, it
may also communicate information to the market regarding the value o f parent firm ’s
equity and in turn, the value o f its rivals. From a M iller and Rock viewpoint, any
form o f securities issuance represents bad news about managers’ expectations about
future cash flows. From this perspective, an asset sell-off conveys unfavorable news
about the value o f the parent firms.
In contrast, M yers and M ajluf [1984] and Nanda [1991] predict managers will
avoid equity issues when their firm ’s equity is undervalued by the market. If a sello ff reflects management’s choice to forego a parent firm equity issue because of its
view that the equity is undervalued, then a sell-off announcement could cause positive
stock price reactions to rivals o f the selling firm if the announcement contains
industry-common information. In a sell-off the firm does choose an action that may
raise financing externally, generally a negative event. Nevertheless, the decision to
sell a subsidiary may be more closely related in nature to other methods o f private
financing such as bank loans and privately placed debt, which are generally viewed as
positive events, since none o f these transactions involve significant disclosure of
information to the public. Instead, the seller communicates sufficient private
information to the buyer to facilitate the transaction rather than providing extensive
public information to financial market participants. From this perspective, assuming
that not all o f the inform ation is firm specific, there would be a positive effect on
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rivals o f the parent firm . Thus, the securities issuance perspective leads to ambiguous
predictions with respect to valuation effects o f sell-off announcements on rivals o f
selling firms.
If the proceeds from a sell-off are retained by management, sell-offs may
exacerbate agency costs. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] relate asset sales and
agency costs based on Jensen’s free cash flow argument. They argue their evidence is
inconsistent with the operating efficiency view o f Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987].
They report that firms near distress account for the majority o f asset sales and that
investors place greater value on asset sales w here proceeds are used to retire debt than
if the cash is utilized by the firm. M oreover, they report that there is no significant
stock price reaction to sell-offs for companies that retain the proceeds for use within
the firm.
This agency hypothesis implies stock-price reactions for rivals o f divested units
and parents in response to sell-offs may differ based on the use o f the proceeds. In
particular, if Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz’s conclusion that retention o f funds indicates
that a sell-off is largely related to agency difficulties, this firm-specific perspective
im plies that there should not be significant positive intra-industry effects for rivals o f
parents that channel these funds into core business activities. In contrast, if a sell-off
and reinvestm ent strategy indicates that managers are confident about the future
prospects o f core business activities, rivals o f parent firms should sustain positive
returns.
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Finally, i f a sell-off conveys information about the financial distress o f a firm ’s
core business, this signal may be good news for the intra-industry rivals if it indicates
the possible demise o f a competitor, or it may be bad news for rivals if it signals
deteriorating expectations on the part o f managers about future industry conditions. In
this regard, Lang and Stulz [1992] report evidence that rivals o f firms petitioning for
bankruptcy experience significant losses in equity value. This suggests that the
industry information effects dominate any possible competitive effect. If this is the
case, and if retention o f the proceeds o f the sell-off is viewed as an indication o f the
firm ’s failing core business, the asset sell-off should convey negative news about the
related industry and parent firm rivals so there should be negative returns to rivals o f
parent firms in response to sell-off announcements. The predicted announcement
effects for parent firms, rivals o f parent firms, and rivals o f subsidairies for each
method o f restructuring under each o f the three hypotheses are found in Table 2.

8. Summary
Several studies document the significant positive announcement effects o f
equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs. The gains associated with these
restructuring decisions are largely attributed in earlier literature to capturing potential
efficiency gains by moving assets to higher valued uses or the release o f private
information that allows the market to revalue assets accordingly. Viewing
restructuring decisions within the context of financing decisions and the securities
issuance literature provides a means to distinguish between the two hypotheses. In
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Table 2
Predicted direction o f equity revaluation for the relevant firm subject to the
chosen restructuring mechanism under three different hypotheses.
Information
Hypothesis

Efficiency
Hypothesis

Free Cashflow
(Agency Costs)

Carveout

Positive

Positive

Negative*

Spin-off

Positive

Positive

Parent:

Sell-off

Positive (no equity issued)
Negative (capital acquisition)
Negative (financial distress)

Positive

Negative*

Rivals o f
Parents:
Carveout

Positive

Negative

Spin-off

Positive

Negative

Sell-off

Positive (no equity issued)
Positive (competitors distress)
Negative (industry distress)

Negative

Carveout

Negative

Negative

Spin-off

Positive

Negative

Sell-off

Positive

Negative

Rivals o f
Subsidiaries:

* I f cash is retained within the firm . Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz argue that if cash
proceeds are not retained within the firm, returns to parents o f sell-offs should be
positive and significant. Their empirical results support this argument.
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particular, if managerial decisions convey elements of information that are relevant to
other firms in the industry, the efficiency and asymmetric information hypotheses can
be separated because each renders unique predictions for returns to intra-industry
rivals.
The efficiency hypothesis predicts negative returns to rivals o f carved-out,
spun-off, or sold-off subsidiaries because rivals are now facing m ore efficient,
competitive entities. The asymmetric information hypothesis also predicts negative
revaluations for rivals o f equity carve-outs because issuing equity is viewed as an
unfavorable signal about asset values or future cash flows o f related assets.
Conversely, the asymmetric information hypothesis predicts positive revaluation
effects to rivals o f spun-off subsidiaries. If managers perceive the value o f a
subsidiary as being higher than the value the market places on those assets or the
value obtainable in a privately negotiated transaction, they may spin-off o f the
subsidiary and allow the market to revalue the assets based in accordance with the
release o f private inform ation. Sell-offs involve a type o f securities issuance that
utilizes private financing mechanisms which renders ambiguous predictions about
intra-industry rivals. If these transactions imply the expectation o f higher future
profits within an industry because o f the use o f private financing, rivals’ share prices
should rise. I f the external financing aspect is dominant, rival share prices are
predicted to fall. The securities issuance perspective also yields m ore complex
predictions about the effect o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs on rivals of
parent firms.
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Chapter 4
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and Asymmetric Information

1. Introduction
This chapter relates recent literature on initial public offerings to the
phenomenon o f equity carve-outs because both o f these securities issuance decisions
involve the initial sale o f equity claims that are to be publicly traded. Each
transaction takes place in an environment in which managers have the freedom to time
the equity offer and determ ine the proportion o f equity to be sold to the public.
Because the IPO market is associated with adverse selection problem s, asymmetric
inform ation arguments paralleling those developed to explain equity carve-out
decisions are analyzed in light o f the empirical evidence associated with IPOs. The
efficiency hypothesis is only applicable as it relates to the use o f compensation
contracts based on market perform ance to im prove managers’ incentives. Arguments
o f diseconomies in management or enhanced operational structures are not relevant to
the IPO case because no assets are transferred between firm s and therefore no
economies o f scale or scope are obtainable.
An IPO is a financial, rather than an economic, restructuring. The empirical
evidence developed in this dissertation indicates that there are significant intra-industry
effects to IPOs which leads to conclusions sim ilar to those derived from the equity
carve-out evidence; that is, announcements o f both equity carve-outs and IPOs are
associated with negative valuation effects o f related industry assets. These results
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support the argument that equity carve-out and IPO announcements reveal private,
managerial information reflecting management’s perceptions o f future changes in
industry asset values, industry risk, and/or cash flows.

2. The literature on IPOs
Generally, efficiency arguments are not applicable in the IPO case because no
assets are transferred between firms. However, managerial efficiency may be
improved by forming compensation contracts based on market perform ance measures.
If this is a prim ary motivation in the decision to IPO, then rivals may experience
negative stock price reactions to IPO announcements because they are facing a
potentially more efficient competitor.
Initial public offerings involve the sale o f equity in closely-held firm s where
existing shareholders may possess non-public information. Similar to equity carveouts, entrepreneurs decide when and what proportion o f the firm to sell to outside
investors. A considerable body o f literature has argued that the market for IPOs may
suffer from adverse selection problems and has used this fram ework o f analysis to
explain the phenomenon o f underpricing that is characteristic o f IPOs. In addition,
because managers have considerable options regarding the use o f proceeds, the
potential for moral hazard is also associated with IPOs. In these respects the IPO
market bears similarities to equity carve-outs.
Access to financing in private markets may allow some firms with favorable
private information to avoid or postpone an IPO. Private financing allows a high-
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quality firm to prosper and grow while developing reputational capital that may help it
ameliorate potential adverse selection problem s in financial markets. Commercial
bank loans and venture capital financing are sources o f external funds which may
allow a high-quality firm to acquire necessary funding for future operations while
maintaining the benefits o f its proprietary information. Slovin and Young [1990],
James and W ier [1990], and Megginson and W eiss [1991] report that financial
contracts with commercial banks and venture capitalists act as a certification
mechanism that reduces the underpricing associated with IPOs.
Given the availability of private funding for firms with favorable inside
inform ation, announcements o f the intent to go public may suggest an adverse
selection problem . If managers possess unfavorable non-public information about
asset values or future cash flows, there is an incentive to go public before the
inform ation reaches financial markets. In doing so, insiders capture a higher price for
the equity than might otherwise be possible at a later date when the information
becomes public.
Previous literature has concentrated on the behavior o f IPO underpricing and
no attention had been focused on the information effects o f announcements o f intent to
go public, largely because no equity o f the announcing firm trades at that time. If,
however, announcements o f intent to go public indicate an adverse selection problem
and serve as an unfavorable signal about the value o f relevant assets, and if this
inform ation applies to other firms in the industry, there should be negative intra
industry effects on this date.
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Formal models o f the IPO market developed by Leland and Pyle [1977],
Titman and Trueman [1986], Grinblatt and Hwang [1989], Allen and Faulhaber
[1989], and W elch [1989] assume that an adverse selection problem exists and suggest
that IPO decisions are likely to signal unfavorable information about the value o f the
underlying assets. Included in these models are mechanisms that high-quality firms
can employ to tem per the unfavorable information content o f these announcements.
Among these signalling mechanisms are (1) the proportion o f the firm retained by the
entrepreneur, (2) the degree o f underpricing, and (3) the em ploym ent o f prestigious
auditors. Booth and Smith [1986], Beatty and Ritter [1986], and C arter and M anaster
[1990] develop models which indicate that the use o f prestigious underwriters in an
IPO also serves to certify firm quality. W elch’s model o f the IPO market, in which
well-informed entrepreneurs offer equity to less well informed outside investors,
closely accords with the arguments developed earlier in this dissertation relating to
equity carve-outs. Thus, the tests developed earlier for equity carve-outs that are
based on private managerial information being conveyed in securities issuance
decisions can also be applied to IPOs. Similar to the equity carve-out case, it is
hypothesized that if IPOs are indicative o f unfavorable non-public information about
relevant asset values, and if elements o f the information are applicable to related
industry assets, then equity o f intra-industry rivals is likely to be overvalued by the
market. Thus, an announcement o f the intent to go public may cause a downward
revision o f the equity o f intra-industry rivals.
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In contrast, Rock [1986] develops a model o f adverse selection in IPO markets
that provides a different explanation for the underpricing associated with IPOs. He
argues that the inform ational differences among investors will result in a w inner’s
curse problem . Rock models the IPO market given the dichotomous condition o f
perfectly inform ed and completely uninformed investors. H e observes that fully
informed investors only participate in an initial offering if the offer is underpriced. If
the offer is overpriced, only the uninformed investors purchase shares so that these
investors purchase all o f the shares o f overpriced issues. In contrast, uninformed
investors compete with fully informed investors for the underpriced issues. Rock
concludes that uninformed investors, aware o f this adverse selection problem , will
only participate in IPOs if the offers are, on average, underpriced sufficiently to
compensate them for the bias they face in the allocation process. I f this
characterization o f the IPO market is correct, an announcement o f an IPO does not
convey private information to the public because o f the assumed information structure,
i.e. perfectly informed investors have an informational advantage over managers. As
a result, there should be no stock price effects on rivals o f the announcing firm.
Benveniste and Spindt [1989] argue that investment bankers use underpricing
for inform ation acquisition. Underpricing is used to induce investors to truthfully
release information pertinent to pricing the IPO during the pre-issuing period. Baron
and Holstrom [1980] and Baron [1982] focus on inform ational asymmetries between
the firm and the investment banker to explain the underpricing o f IPOs. They
hypothesize that the investment bank’s superior knowledge o f m arket conditions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
allows it to expend less marketing effort, while enhancing relationships with its clients
who purchase IPOs, by underpricing new issues. However, M uscarella and
Vetsuypens [1989] find that investment banking firms underprice themselves when
they go public as well, casting doubt on this explanation. Finally, Tinic [1988] posits
that underpricing IPOs may be a rational response by investment bankers w ho seek to
reduce the frequency and severity o f law suits. The hypothesis stems from the fact
that the Securities Act o f 1933 makes all signatories liable for any material omissions
in the prospectus. If underpricing o f IPOs reflects inform ation gathering techniques,
monopsonistic power o f investment bankers, or attempts to circum vent future legal
liabilities, the announcement o f an IPO by the firm ’s managers should have no share
price effects on rival firm equity.

3. S u m m ary
The notion o f managers possessing an informational advantage (W elch [1989])
contrasts with the assumptions o f Rock [1986] (well inform ed outside investors with
an informational advantage over other investors and managers) and Baron and
Holstrom [1980], and Baron [1980], who assume investment bankers are better
informed than managers. If managers possess private inform ation, as m odeled by
W elch, and if elements o f the information are industry common, then the decision to
go public may result in negative valuation effects on intra-industry rivals.
Conversely, if managers do not have private information, as argued by Rock, Baron
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and H olstrom , and Baron, then an IPO decision should not convey information that
will impact rival firm ’s equity values.
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Chapter 5
M ethodology and Descriptive Statistics

1. Introduction
This chapter describes the data selection criterion and methodology used to
calculate stock price returns in this dissertation. Section 1 details the data collection
and sample construction. The second section describes market model methodology
which is used to empirically measure announcement effects o f restructuring decisions.
Section 3 contains descriptive statistics o f the samples used in the study.

2. Sample generation
Each o f the samples used in this study is developed from firms listed on the
New York and American Stock Exchanges (NYSE and AM EX, respectively). F o r
both carve-outs and spin-offs, there is a requirem ent that the newly traded equity also
be listed on NYSE/AM EX. This requirem ent assures that these events are o f major
importance. This requirem ent also implies that all of the events used in each sample
represent ultimately completed transactions.
The first set o f sample firms is comprised o f parent firms announcing an equity
carve-out, intra-industry rivals of the parent firm, and rivals o f the subsidiary being
carved-out. The second set o f sample firms includes parent firms announcing a spin
off, their intra-industry rivals, and the rivals o f the subsidiary being spun-off. The
date of the Dow Jones News W ire press release is used to identify the announcement

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
date o f the equity carve-out and spin-off transactions. The third sample contains firms
announcing sell-offs, the rivals o f parent firms, and the rivals o f the divested units.
The event date for a sell-off transaction is date o f the Wall Street Journal article
announcing the sale o f the assets to an identified purchaser, to an unidentified
purchaser, or in an auction where the purchaser is not immediately identifiable.
The following selection criteria are used to further refine the samples and
narrow the focus o f the dissertation to U .S. industrial firms:
(1) Closed-end funds (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are
excluded from all three samples. Financial firms are also excluded.
(2) Events in which parent firm s announce restructuring decisions
concurrently with other major corporate decisions or activities are also
omitted from the analysis
(3) Foreign firms (parents and subsidiaries) are excluded from the
samples. However, U .S. rivals o f these firms are included in the
analysis o f rival portfolios.
Rivals portfolios for parent firms and disposed asset(s) are created by matching
4-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC). The SIC codes for parent firms
and disposed subsidiaries/divisions are retrieved from the CRSP tapes and Predicast.
This classification is checked using Standard and P oor’s quarterly stock reports and
Value Line to ensure that the SIC code accurately identifies the firm ’s m ajor business
activity. Once the event firm ’s SIC code is established, CRSP, Value Line, and
Predicast are used to identify other firm s whose major business activity corresponds to
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the same industry as the event firm. These rival firms are identified as firm s carrying
the same 4-digit SIC code. Standard and P oor’s quarterly stock reports are then used
to confirm each potential rival’s core business and SIC code before the firm is
included in the event firm ’s portfolio o f rivals.
The equity carve-out sample covers the period 1981-1990. T he development
o f procedures in 1983 by the NYSE enabling firms to list concurrently with their IPO
is reflected in the data which shows these transactions becom e m ore common by the
m id-1980’s (table 6). The sole sample carve-out prior to 1983 is listed on the
AM EX. Firm s qualifying for direct listing must meet requirem ents on the market
value o f shares, the num ber o f shares, and the number o f shareholders. This sample
is developed by identifying the first-trade dates on the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP) daily returns file. Only new listings that can be verified as
equity carve-outs using the Wall Street Journal. M oody’s, Standard and P oor’s, and
the National Stock Summary are retained in the sample. This procedure produces a
total o f 36 eligible equity carve-outs. After omitting parent firms with SIC codes
4900-4999 and 6000-6999, and firms lacking sufficient data in the estimation period
(i.e. firms trading on fewer than one-half of the total trading days in the estimation
period), the parent group contains 22 events for which there are 21 rival portfolios
with matching 4-digit SIC codes. There are 25 rival portfolios fo r the carved-out
subsidiaries. The parent group has three fewer events than the carved-out rival group
because the parents o f three o f the carve-outs are financial firm s and are omitted from
the study.
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The spin-off sample also covers the period 1981 to 1990 for reasons similar to
those explained above. Stock distributions coded as spin-offs on the CRSP Daily
M aster File are used to create a sample o f 54 announcements. These announcements
are verified in the same manner as the carve-outs. Excluded from this sample are
four spin-off announcements that are part o f m anagement’s defensive tactics against
takeover attempts. Seventeen more announcements are excluded because o f the parent
firm ’s industry classification o r because o f missing returns data in the estimation
period. The final sample for the spin-off group consists o f 33 parent firms for which
25 parent rival portfolios are developed. Portfolios o f rival firms for 37 spun-off
subsidiaries are available.
The spin-off rival sample is associated with four m ore events than the parent
sample due to announcements containing m ultiple spin-offs. Rollins Incorporated
(June 4, 1986) and General Mills (September 24, 1985) both announced that they
w ere each spinning o ff two subsidiaries simultaneously. Therefore, these two
announcements are associated with a total o f two parent firms and four spun-off
subsidiaries. Household International (January 11, 1989) announced that it would be
forming three new stand alone firms by spinning off three o f its subsidiaries. Thus,
this announcement is associated with one parent firm and three spun-off subsidiaries.
These three announcements account for the difference in the number o f observations
in the two samples.
Firm s announcing sell-offs are identified by using M ergers & Acquisitions’
annual "Largest Divestitures" and "Top 100" transactions lists for the period 1981 to
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1991. This results in 322 announcements for which sell-off dates are verified in the
Wall Street Journal index. By employing the same selection criteria outlined above
and excluding foreign firms, 175 sell-off events are identified. The sample o f rivals
o f the selling parents comprises 167 portfolios. There are 190 portfolios o f rivals of
sold-off subsidiaries. The subsidiary rival sample contains more events than the sello ff parent sample because several o f the parent firms are conglomerates, foreign or
private companies, or are not traded on the NYSE or AMEX.
Firm s involved in conventional IPOs are identified as those firms associated
with start-up trading on the CRSP daily returns file. The IPOs are verified using the
W all Street Journal. M oody’s, Standard and P oor’s, and the National Stock Summary.
T he sample begins in 1983 when the NYSE developed procedures allowing firm s to
list concurrently with their initial public offering, and ends in 1990. The sample of
intra-industry rivals consists o f firms sharing the same 4-digit SIC code as firms
announcing a conventional IPO.
F o r inclusion in the sample, each event must have at least one intra-industry
rival with returns for a sufficient num ber o f trading days to estimate the market
model. Excluded from this sample are conglomerates (SIC 9980), closed-end funds
and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). There are 72 IPOs
and corresponding rival portfolios (257 total rivals) in the final sample.
A subgroup o f 38 o f the parent firms announcing general corporate
restructurings is also identified. In these announcements the firm typically states that
it intends to concentrate on a few o f its prim ary businesses and streamline itself by
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shedding the remaining assets in the near future. Often the announcement indicates
that the firm has hired an investment banker to advise them on their restructuring and
assist them with asset disposition. These restructuring announcements are found in
the 18 months prior to, or subsequent to, an asset disposition announcement via sello ff or spin-off. O f these 29 events, 25 portfolios o f rival firms o f the restructuring
firms are developed.

3. Methodology
Stock price reactions to announcements o f corporate restructuring are measured
using standard event study methodology as described in Brown and W arner [1985].
Under semi-strong form market efficiency, the announcem ent effects provide unbiased
valuation adjustments corresponding to the inform ation contained in the announcement
and changes in the perceptions of the firm ’s asset values, future cash flows, and risk,
held by the market. Standard event study methodology will also allow the results of
this dissertation to be easily compared to the results reported in earlier event studies
using sim ilar methodology.
Event study methodology requires param eters o f a returns generating process,
which are obtained via an ordinary least squares regression. The param eters o f the
regression are estimated over an interval that is chronologically close to, but does not
include, the announcement window. This estimation process is refer to as the market
model, which is described as:
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RJt = ctj + P / mr + ejt

( 1)

where:
Rjt

= the return for firm j on day t,

Gj

= mean return not explained by the market,

/?j

= firm j ’s sensitivity to the m arket’s return - its
risk factor,

Rmt

= return o f the m arket index for day t,

ejt

= the statistical error or the regression residual.

The predicted return for a firm for a day in the event period is the return given by the
market model on that day using the estimates o f gj and (3i from the pre-event period.
That is, the predicted return for firm j on day t is:

(2 )

T he prediction error, PE, is defined as:

(3)

The share price reaction for the parent firm s announcing a corporate
restructuring are estimated by calculating the average daily prediction error (APE)
using the market model around the event date t= 0 , defined as the announcement date.
The average daily prediction errors are calculated as:
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w here N is the num ber o f firms in the sample trading on day t. Cumulative average
prediction errors, CAPE, defined as the sum o f the daily average predictions errors
over some relevant tim e period, say t= t, to t = t 2, are calculated as:

h
CAPE = Y ,A P E t

(5)

«=t,

The equal weighted CRSP index is used as the explanatory variable in the least
squares regression. The pre-event estimation period used to estim ate the market
model is t = -240 to t= -1 2 1 . F or subsequent statistical tests, the null hypothesis is that
the A PE is equal to zero for each event subperiod. The test statistic is the ratio o f the
A PE (CAPE) to its standard deviation (the square root o f the product o f D, the
num ber o f days in the event window, and the variance) estimated over the pre-event
period. The test statistic is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis if the
APE are independent, identically distributed and normal.
F or the equity carve-out and spin-off samples, the event window used to
com pare and interpret announcement stock price reactions is defined as t = 0 and
t = + l , where t = 0 is the Dow Jones News W ire date. In both cases, the
announcement reaction is usually concentrated on day 0. However, to obtain results
that are more readily comparable to previous event study results, the conventional
two-day window is adopted. A two-day window also facilitates capture o f
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announcement effects for announcements occurring late in one trading day that may
create spill-over effects on the following trading day. F or the sell-off sample, the
event window is defined as t = - l and t= 0 , where t = 0 is the Wall Street Journal date.
The window is defined in this manner because the news wire usually carries the
announcement on the day prior to its appearance in the Wall Street Journal.
Therefore, the day previous to the WSJ date is included in the measurement o f the
m arket’s reaction to the announcement.
Equally weighted portfolios o f intra-industry rivals are created to obtain
prediction errors associated with the industry effects o f asset disposition
announcements. Prediction errors for each rival are calculated using the same
methodology described above. The mean prediction errors for the rival portfolios are
calculated by averaging the adjusted returns over all portfolios for each day in the
relevant subperiod.

4. Sample descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the equity carve-out, IPO, spin-off, and sell-off
samples are found in Tables 3-7. The distribution for the market value o f the
subsidiaries involved in the restructuring transactions is reported in Table 3. F or the
equity carve-outs, IPOs, and spin-offs, the market value is defined as the product o f
the number o f shares outstanding and the price per share four weeks after the initial
trading day. Because o f the requirem ent that the equity o f these new firm s must
begin trading on the NYSE/AM EX, the samples used in this dissertation tend to be
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Table 3
The distribution o f m arket values1 o f newly traded public firm s created through an
equity carve-out, an IPO , or a spin-off are given in panel A. F o r sell-off
transactions, the distribution o f values reflects sales prices. The distribution o f parent
market values2 two days prior to the restructuring announcement is given in panel B.
The distribution o f the relative size o f the disposed assets/equity issue to the parent
firm is given in panel C.
Equity
carve-outs

IPOs

Spin-offs

Sell-offs

Panel A: Newly traded public firm ’s market value o f equity
and sell-off transaction price ($ millions)
N =25

N =72

N =37

N =179

Mean

692.37

155.04

319.70

657.19

Median

462.15

68.04

198.00

507.10

M aximum

2,687.50

1,913.63

1,824.52

4149.60

M inimum

12.86

6.77

106.17

79.00

Panel B: M arket value o f parent firms ($ millions)
Mean

3,161,606

155.04

1,473,670

5,644,937

Median

1,431,021

61.04

1,076,400

2,371,841

M aximum

14,659,177

1,916.63

6,437,376

74,058,416

M inimum

56,657

6.77

16,273

133,204

Panel C: Proportion o f disposed asset/equity issue market value to parent
m arket value
Mean

16.00%

45.68%

29.99%

32.71%

M edian

6.00%

41.00%

21.11%

17.47%

M aximum

86.42%

100.00%

114.02%

223.83%

M inimum
1.23%
10.00%
4.83%
0.76%
‘M arket value is defined as the number o f shares outstanding multiplied by the market
price per share four weeks after the initial trading day for equity carve-outs, IPO s and
spin-offs.
2M arket value is defined as the number o f shares outstanding multiplied by the market
price per share two days prior to the initial announcement o f a restructuring decision.
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substantially larger than those used in previous studies. F o r the sell-off sample, the
value is defined as the price received by the selling firm. This sample is also larger,
on average, than samples used in previous studies. This difference is largely due to
the fact that assets sales tend to increase in size through time. The difference may
also be a function o f the financial condition o f the sample firm s. F or example, the
proportion o f distressed selling firm s in this sample appears to be significantly smaller
than that in the Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] sample.
For the 25 equity carve-outs in this sample the mean (median) value is $692
million ($462 million) versus a median value o f $20-$30 million for Schipper and
Smith [1986] sample. F or the 72 conventional IPO announcements the mean and
median values are $155 million and $61 million respectively. Thus, the equity carveouts are large relative to conventional IPOs. The 37 spin-off transactions create new
firms with an mean (median) m arket value o f $319 million ($198 million). Previous
studies on spin-offs by Schipper and Smith [1983], H ite and Owers [1983], and Miles
and Rosenfeld [1983] do not report the absolute market value o f spun-off units. For
179 sell-off transactions the mean (median) sale price is $657 million ($507 million).
The asset sales in this sample are large relative to the samples used by Lang, Poulsen,
and Stulz, and the H ite and Owers, who report mean (median) sale values o f $124
million ($28 million) and $79 million ($44 million), repsectively.
Parent firms perform ing equity carve-outs tend to be larger, on average, than
those involved in spin-offs, but sm aller than parent firms involved in sell-offs. The
mean (median) market value o f the parents firms perform ing carve-outs is $3.2 billion
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($1.4 billion). The relatively smaller spin-off parent firm s have a mean (median)
market value o f $1.5 billion ($1 billion). The mean (median) market value o f sell-off
parents is $5.6 billion ($2.4 billion). Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz report mean and
median equity values for sell-off parent firms o f $949 million and $150 million
respectively. Thus, the market value o f parent firm equity and the sell-off transaction
price are substantially larger in this sample than in samples used in previous studies.
The distributions o f the ratio o f the value o f the restructuring transaction to the
market value o f equity o f the parent firm are reported in Panel C o f Table 3. F or
equity carve-out transactions, the ratio is defined as the proceeds from the issue o f
subsidiary equity divided by the market value o f the parent firm two days prior to the
announcement o f the intent to carve out the subsidiary. The mean (median) ratio in
this sample is 16 percent (six percent), which is smaller than the median ratio of
approxim ately 10 percent reported by Schipper and Smith [1986]. Even though the
mean proceeds in this sample are twice as large as those in Schipper and Sm ith’s
sample, the mean parent firm market value o f equity in the form er sample is several
times larger than in latter sample, accounting for the sm aller median ratio found in the
form er sample.
F or spin-offs, the ratio is defined as the m arket value equity o f the new
publicly traded firm 28 days subsequent to the initial trade date, divided by the market
value o f equity o f the parent firm two days prior to the initial announcement o f the
spin-off. The mean (median) ratio is 30 percent (21 percent) and is substantially
larger than the median o f 6.6 percent reported by H ite and Owers [1983]. Similar to
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the equity carve-out transactions, this sample o f spin-off transactions contains larger
parent firms spinning o ff larger portions o f assets than in previous studies.
The relative value ratio for sell-off transactions is calculated by dividing the
sale price o f divested assets by the market value o f equity o f the parent firm two days
before the announcement o f the asset sale. The mean (median) proportion sold in this
sample is 33 percent (17 percent). The mean (median) proportion reported by Hite
and Owers is 16 percent (eight percent), indicating that the firms in their sample are
selling off fewer assets relative to the parent firm size. Conversely, Lang, Poulsen,
and Stulz report mean (median) ratios o f 69 percent (22 percent). However, it should
be noted that this sample contains a larger proportion o f distressed firms in need o f
capital which suggests that these firms should have to sell-off a larger proportion of
their relatively smaller asset base.
Table 4 provides the distribution o f the market values for rival firms and the
num ber o f rivals per event. The new firms created by an equity carve-out tend to be
larger than their rivals. The distribution o f m arket values for these rivals has a mean
(median) market value o f over $1.1 billion ($278 million) but is skewed by a few
relatively large firms which explains why the mean market value o f the rivals is large
compared to that o f the equity carve-outs. T he 25 rival portfolios include 150
individual rivals. Mean and median number o f rivals per event are 6 and 5
respectively. The mean (median) size o f the rival firms o f IPOs o f $800 million
($214 million) is notably larger than that o f the announcing firms. This is in contrast
to the case o f equity carve-outs. There is a mean (median) o f 3.57 (2) rivals per
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the market value o f intra-industry rivals o f carve-outs, IPOs,
spin-offs, and sell-offs are given in panel A. Descriptive statistics for the num ber of
rivals per event are found in panel B.
Equity
carve-outs

IPOs

Spin-offs

Sell-off
parents

Sell-off
units

Panel A: Rival firm market value o f equity

1,132.20

800.15

903.92

3,799,439

2,349,603

Median

278.82

214.15

165.27

1,239,596

607,296

Maximum

27,267.02

15,520.06

24,088.00

80,951,136

74,077,488

Minimum

7.96

3.51

3.06

1026

1519

N =223

N =1623

2
II

o

i n
i—H

Mean

II
£

N =257

Panel B: Num ber o f Rivals per event
Mean

6.0

3.6

6.0

9.0

6.9

Median

5

2

5

7

5

Maximum

36

19

33

30

29

Minimum

1

1

1

1

1
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event and 257 total rivals included in the study. The rivals o f spun-off units have a
mean (median) market value o f $903 million ($165 million). There are 223 individual
rival firm s comprising 37 rivals portfolios. The mean (median) numbers o f rivals per
spin-off announcement are 6 and 5, respectively. The market value o f rivals o f the
parent firms o f sell-offs is substantially larger than that o f the rivals o f any other
group but are smaller on average, than the parents themselves. The mean and median
market values for these rival firms are $3.8 billion and $1.2 billion respectively. The
mean (median) rival portfolio consists o f nine (seven) firm s. The market values of
the rivals o f the sold-off units are also substantially larger than those o f the rivals of
the carve-outs, spin-offs, and IPOs. These rivals firms have a mean (median) o f $2.3
billion ($607) million. T he mean num ber o f rival firms per portfolio is seven, the
median is five.
Distributions for the offer size, initial returns, and the proportion o f equity
ownership retained by the parent (owner/mangers) for carve-outs and IPO s are
provided in Table 5. Offer size is calculated as the product o f the num ber o f shares
sold to the public and the offer price. Underpricing (i.e. initial returns) is calculated
as the percentage price change from offering price to closing price on the first day of
trading. Equity carve-out transactions have a mean (median) offer size o f $259
million ($102 million). The mean and median underpricing is 2.03% and 1.25%
respectively. The mean underpricing o f this sample is sim ilar to that o f Schipper and
Sm ith’s [1986], who report an average underpricing o f 1.70% . Fifty two percent of
this sam ple’s initial returns are positive and 36% are zero.
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Descriptive statistics for offer size and underpricing for equity carve-outs
and initial public offerings.
Equity carve-outs
N =25

IPOs
N =72

Panel A: Offer size1 ($ millions)
Mean

258.89

44.63

Median

101.75

18.68

Maximum

1,311.50

436.84

Minimum

5.22

2.90

Panel B: Initial return2
Mean

2.03%

4.78%

Median

1.25%

1.76%

Maximum

12.50%

68.33%

Minimum

-2.63%

-5.36%

Proportion o f returns > 0

0.52

0.65

Proportion o f returns < 0

0.36

0.19

Panel C: Proportion o f equity ownership retained by the parent
Mean

68.26%

54.32%

Median

80.00%

59.00%

Maximum

94.50%

90.00%

Minimum
31.00%
0.00%
‘Defined as the offer price multiplied by the shares sold to the public, excluding
overallotments.
2Defined as the percentage price change from the offering price to the closing price on
the first day o f trading.
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For conventional IPOs, the mean (median) offer size is $45 million ($19
million) and the mean (median) initial return is 4.78% (1.76% ). The average initial
return is low relative to previous studies such as R itter [1984] who reports average
underpricing o f 9.6% for 382 firms (mostly NASDAQ and OTC) with sales greater
than $4 million. Comparing the NYSE/AM EX IPO results and R itter’s results
through a difference in means test yields a t-statistic o f 3.02, indicating rejection o f
the null hypothesis that the mean underpricing for the two groups is equal.
Relatively low average underpricing in the NYSE/AM EX sample o f
conventional IPOs is consistent with the notion that IPOs listing directly on these
exchanges are characterized by a smaller degree o f asymmetric information and
therefore, less ex ante uncertainty about their equity value prior to an initial public
offer. These results suggest that firms that are able to delay their IPOs, through
private financing for example, until qualifying for direct listing on the NYSE/AM EX
sustain less underpricing.
The proportion o f equity ownership retained by the parent o f a carved-out
subsidiary, or owner/managers in the case o f an IPO , is defined as the fraction o f
total shares outstanding held by the parent (owner/managers) following the initial
public sale o f equity in the new publicly traded firm. The mean (median) proportion
retained in an equity carve-out is 68 percent (80 percent). This suggests that equity
carve-outs are an important means for firms to raise capital and create in-house
contracts based on market prices without losing control o f the subsidiary. F or IPOs,
the mean (median) retention rate is 54 percent (59 percent).
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Table 6 provides the distribution o f restructuring and initial public offering
announcements by year. It is im portant to note that all the samples used in this study
are m ore recent than those used in previous studies and there is very little overlap
between them. The distribution for equity carve-outs indicates that these
announcements are m ore common in the mid to late 1980’s. A sim ilar pattern is
observed for spin-off announcements. Because the IPO sample begins in 1983 it
appears to have the same pattern. Due to the pre-1983 listing restriction o f the
NYSE, the announcement pattern o f IPOs prior to 1983 is probably sim ilar to those o f
carve-outs and spin-off. Sell-off announcements appear to be evenly distributed
through out the 1980’s.
Table 7 provides a distribution o f restructuring and initial public offering
announcements by industry classification. M ost of the parent firm s announcing equity
carve-outs belong to the Food and Kindred Products (SIC =2000) and Rubber and
M iscellaneous Plastics Products (SIC =3000) groups. The largest 4-digit SIC code
concentration occurs in the Integrated Petroleum Refining (S IC =2910) and Prim ary
M etals Industry (SIC =3300) groups, which provide three announcements each. Most
o f the carved-out units belong to the M etal Mining (SIC = 1000) and Food and
Kindred Products (SIC =2000) groups. W ithin these classifications are four carvedout units operating in the Gold M ining (SIC = 1041) industry and four carved-out units
in the Oil Field Services (SIC = 1310) sector.
Firm s announcing spin-offs are less concentrated by industry than the carve-out
parents. The largest representation is in the Prim ary M etals Industry (S IC =3000).
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Table 6
Distribution o f equity carve-out, spin-off, sell-off and IPO sample announcements by
year.
Carve-out
parent

Carve-out
unit

Spin-off
parent

Spun-off
unit

Sell-off
parent

Sold-off
unit

IPO

1979

0

0

2

2

0

0

0

1980

0

0

1

2

4

5

0

1981

1

2

2

2

20

26

0

1982

0

0

3

4

16

19

0

1983

1

1

0

0

14

18

9

1984

0

0

2

3

11

16

6

1985

2

2

3

3

18

21

7

1986

4

5

1

2

19

18

24

1987

6

7

5

5

18

17

18

1988

4

3

4

4

19

22

8

1989

2

3

8

8

12

15

0

1990

2

2

3

2

6

7

0

1991

0

0

0

0

22

19

0

Total

22

25

34

37

179

203

72
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Table 7
D istribution o f equity carve-out, spin-off, sell-off and IPO sample announcements by
SIC code.
Carve-out
parent

Carved
-out
unit

Spin-off
parent

Spun
-off
unit

Sell-off
parent

Sold
-off
unit

IPO

1000

2

10

3

6

7

27

3

2000

9

7

5

6

58

71

16

3000

7

3

8

14

36

44

23

4000

0

1

3

5

23

27

5

5000

2

3

4

3

7

21

15

6000

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

7000

0

0

5

2

5

9

7

8000

0

0

2

1

2

4

2

9000

2

0

3

0

40

0

0

Total

22

25

34

37

179

203

72
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However, none o f the eight firms in this classification share the same 4-digit SIC
code. Only one 4-digit classification contains m ore than one event, that is 9980 which
is the code for conglomerate firms. The activities o f the parent firms involved in selloffs are eclectic. The highest concentration o f parent firms is found in the Food and
Kindred Products sector (SIC =2000). The second highest concentration, S IC =9000,
is represented by 40 conglomerate firms. The sold-off units have a sim ilar pattern.
Seventy-one o f these subsidiaries/divisions operate in Food and Kindred Products
industries.

Fourty-four o f the units are found in the Rubber and Miscellaneous

Plastics (SIC =3000) sector.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Results

1. Introduction
This chapter reports share-price responses to restructuring decisions. Section 2
reports the effects o f equity carve-out announcements on firm s announcing the carveout, its rivals, and the rivals o f the carved-out subsidiary. Significantly negative
reactions are reported for carve-out rivals which are consistent with both the
asymmetric inform ation and efficiency hypotheses and therefore do not differentiate
between these different motivations related to carve-out decisions. Section 3 reports
evidence on the announcement effects for rivals o f firms going public. There are
negative returns to this set o f rival firms which are consistent with those found for
rivals o f equity carve-outs, providing support for the asym m etric information
hypothesis. T he empirical results associated with spin-off announcem ents are found in
section 4. There are positive intra-industry effects for units to be spun-off which are
consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, but contradict efficiency
explanations as a motivation for restructuring. Section 5 reports the im pact o f sell-off
announcements. The results o f these tests show no significant intra-industry effects
for rivals o f either the announcing firm or the sold-off unit, perhaps reflecting the
private nature o f the transaction. However, an examination o f general restructuring
announcements indicates that a managerial decision to concentrate on a core set o f
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activities conveys favorable information about the future o f these industries since rival
returns to these announcements are positive. The final section contains a summary.

2. Equity carve-outs
Table 8 contains empirical results for parents o f equity carve-outs, portfolios
o f the intra-industry rivals o f announcing firm s, and portfolios o f rivals o f the carvedout subsidiary. The average two-day excess return for parent firm s, reported in
column (1), is 1.70% with a t-statistic o f 2.53, significant at the 5% level. Seventyseven percent o f the firms have positive stock-price reactions. There is no positive
price run-up for the parent firm prior to the announcement and post-event returns are
also norm al. These results are comparable to the findings o f Schipper and Smith
[1986], who report a five-day excess return o f 1.83% with a t-statistic o f 2.55 for a
sample o f 76 equity carve-outs for the period 1965-1983. However, the median size
o f proceeds from this sample is $101 million versus $20-$30 million for the Schipper
and Smith sample, indicating that the carve-outs in this sample are larger equity
offerings.
The two-day average excess return to rivals of the carved-out subsidiary is 1.05% which is statistically significant at the 5% level, column (3). The pre-event
and post-event returns for the industry portfolios are normal. Furtherm ore, 64% o f
the rival portfolios have negative announcement returns. Thus, the equity o f firms
whose assets are employed in the same industry as the carved-out unit is revalued
downward in response to the carve-out announcement. This result is consistent with
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Table 8
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s announcing equity
carve-outs, carve-out parent rivals grouped by portfolio, and carve-out rivals grouped
by portfolio.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.

Equity carve-out announcements

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
carved-out
subsidiaries

22 events

21 events
172 rivals

25 events
145 rivals

1.70“
(2.53)

.39
(.50)

-1.05“
(-2.35)

Proportion of
returns > 0

[-77]

[.43]

[-36]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-1)

-3.07
(-.42)

.01
(.00)

.00
(.00)

Post-event
interval
(2,15)

.45
(.25)

.15
(.07)

-.12
(-.09)

1.46

00
cn

(1)
Equity
carve-out
parents

Two-day event
return (0,1)

Range o f returns
-15.57 to 15.22
— i ,u
.
. . '■
’Significant at the 10% level.
“ Significant at the 5% level.
‘“ Significant at the 1 % level.

t v ji—

1

Median
(portfolio)
return

(2)

-2.19 to 8.06

-.41
-7.86 to 4.34

j

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

N anda’s carve-out model and implies that equity carve-outs are interpreted as a signal
that management regards the carved-out assets as overvalued. Alternatively, negative
returns to rivals may reflect expected improvements in the efficiency o f the carved-out
unit that reduce cash flows to rival firms. The aggregate loss o f shareholder wealth
for industry rivals, calculated as the sum o f the two-day returns multiplied by the
m arket value o f equity o f each firm, is $2.5 billion. This is 39% o f the aggregate
gross proceeds received by the firms announcing the carve-outs.
Returns to intra-industry rivals o f parent firm s announcing carve-outs are
reported in column (2). The returns for the two-day event window are 0.39% and not
statistically significant. M oreover, only 43 % o f the portfolios experience positive
announcement reactions. Thus, market values o f rivals o f parent firms are not
affected by the carve-out announcement. The pre-event and post-event interval
returns also are normal.
Overall, these results provide evidence supporting the information hypothesis
as an explanation for equity carve-outs. Returns to parent firms are positive and
significant, as reported in earlier studies. Announcement returns to rivals o f carvedout subsidiaries are negative and significant. This suggests that negative news is
released by the carve-out announcement and that some elements o f this information
are industry-com m on, not solely firm-specific. This result is consistent with the
M yers and M ajluf-type model o f Nanda which implies that an equity carve-out is a
negative signal o f managerial expectations about future cash flows o f the carved-out
unit.
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Norm al returns to parent rival portfolios indicate that an equity carve-out
announcement contains little industry-common information with respect to the
activities o f the parent’s business. This provides little support for N anda’s
asymmetric information model that implies that an equity carve-out conveys favorable
news about the value o f the parent firm. It is also possible that the breadth o f
activities o f parent operations is too extensive to generate an accurate matching of
industry related activities based on SIC codes, thus weakening the pow er o f the test
relative to the case o f the carved-out units, which are m ore narrowly focused
economic entities.
These results can also be viewed as providing support for the efficiency
hypothesis. Carving-out a subsidiary may create im portant efficiency gains for the
carved-out subsidiary. Increased efficiency implies that the subsidiary will be more
competitive in its markets which should have an adverse impact on intra-industry
rivals. The negative returns to the rivals o f the subsidiaries support this argument.
The size o f the returns to portfolios o f rivals o f the subsidiary are small relative to the
gains to parent firms. I f efficiency considerations are the sole source for this result,
such gains should be approximately equal. Thus, although the evidence from equity
carve-outs provides support for both the asymmetric inform ation hypothesis and the
efficiency hypothesis, the size o f the announcement losses to subsidiary rivals make it
unlikely that the sole factor is efficiency gains. To gain further insight on the issue,
intra-industry effects on IPOs can be analyzed.
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3. IPOs
Table 9 contains the empirical results for 72 equally-weighted portfolios o f
rival firms in response to the announcement of an IPO within the industry. The
average two-day excess return for the rival portfolios is -.88% with a t-statistic o f 3.06, which is significant at the 1% level. Thus, although IPOs are small relative to
the m arket value o f other firms in their industry, the intra-industry effects are
com parable to returns observed in response to equity carve-outs. Approximately 74%
o f the portfolios o f IPO rivals have negative returns. The calculated aggregate decline
in shareholder wealth for industry rivals is $1.8 billion, which is 56% o f the
aggregate total proceeds received by the offering firm s. This evidence is consistent
with the hypothesis that announcements o f conventional IPOs convey some
unfavorable industry-common information about asset values and/or future cash flows.
T he fact that relatively small IPOs generate such strong effects casts doubt on the
relevance o f efficiency arguments based on enhanced compensation contracts as a
rationale for such announcement effects. In addition, there is little previous evidence
suggesting that economic efficiency considerations are a prim ary motivation in IPO
decisions.
The negative industry effects for carve-outs and IPOs are approximately equal.
A difference in means test between returns for the two groups generates a calculated tvalue o f .24 which indicates that returns to rivals o f IPOs and rivals o f equity carveouts are not significantly different. Thus, the significantly negative APEs to industry
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Table 9
Cum ulative excess returns (in percent) for rival portfolios o f firms announcing an
initial public offering o f equity to be traded on the NYSE/AM EX.
Cum ulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.

IPO announcements

( 1)
IPO rivals
72 events
258 rivals
Tw o-day event return (0,1)

-1.07***
(-3.67)

Proportion o f returns > 0

.24

Pre-event interval (-121,-1)

-.05
(-.02)

Post-event interval (2,15)

.01
(.01)

M edian portfolio return

-1.04

R ange o f returns
Significant at the 1 % level.

-7.11 to 5.42
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rivals o f IPOs and carve-outs is consistent with the hypothesis that equity issues do
convey unfavorable information about asset values and/or future cash flows.

4. Spin-offs
Table 10 contains empirical results for firms announcing spin-offs, their intra
industry rivals, and the rivals o f the spun-off subsidiaries. The two-day APE for
announcing firms is 1.33% with a t-statistic o f 2.32, as reported in column (1).
Approximately 73% o f these firms have positive two-day announcement returns. The
pre-event and post-event returns are normal. Schipper and Smith [1983], H ite and
Owers [1983], and M iles and Rosenfeld [1983] report two-day announcement returns
o f 2.84% , 3.30% , and 3.34% respectively. The similarity o f these results with those
o f previous spin-off studies indicates that this sample o f spin-offs is also representative
o f these earlier samples.
In column (3) the average announcement period return for the portfolios of
rivals o f spun-off units is a positive 0.68% , which is significant at the 10% level (tstatistic = 1.86). M oreover, approximately 60% o f the portfolio returns are positive.
T here are normal returns in both the pre-event or post-event intervals. The positive
return to rivals o f spun-off units stands in contrast to the negative returns to rivals o f
carved-out units and IPOs. Applying a difference in means to the two-day returns for
rival portfolios o f carve-outs and spin-offs yields a calculated t-value o f 2.76,
rejecting the null hypothesis o f equality at the 1 % level. Likewise, a difference in
means test indicates that returns to rivals o f IPOs are significantly different from the
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Table 10
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firms announcing spin-offs,
spin-off parent rivals grouped by portfolio, and spin-off rivals grouped by portfolio.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Spin-off announcements
(1)

(2)

Spin-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals
of
spun-off
units

33 events

25 events
194 rivals

37 events
217 rivals

Two-day event
return (0,1)

1.33"
(2.32)

.28
(.72)

.68*
(1.86)

Proportion o f
returns > 0

[-73]

[-52]

[-60]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-1)

-5.84
(-.93)

-.01
(-.01)

.04
(.04)

Post-event
interval
(2,15)

-1.42
(-.92)

.09
(.08)

.00
(-00)

-1.00

.13

.60

-1.93 to
2.24

-4.21 to
6.66

Median
(portfolio)
return
Range o f returns

-8.26 to
9.48
'Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
" ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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returns to rivals o f spun-off subsidiaries (t= 3 .4 5 ). This evidence, combined with the
evidence from equity carve-outs, presents support for the hypothesis that equity issues
do convey unfavorable information about asset values and/or future cash flows.
The pattern o f these results supports the asymmetric information hypothesis.
The positive stock-price reaction to spin-off announcements indicates that this method
o f separating a subsidiary from the parent is viewed as a signal o f favorable
information with industry-common elements. M ore specifically, a spin-off allows a
parent to separate a subsidiary while simultaneously signaling m anagement’s
reluctance to issue equity in either the parent or the spun-off subsidiary, o r to sell the
subsidiary to a third party. In contrast, the results are inconsistent with the efficiency
hypothesis which predicts negative valuation effects for intra-industry rivals o f spuno ff units. If a firm restructures via a spin-off so as to induce a subsidiary to become
more efficient and m ore competitive, such announcements should have negative
effects for rivals o f the spun-off firms. The positive returns to spin-offs, however, do
not support this prediction and contrast with the negative rival returns to carve-outs.
This suggests that the negative effects observed for rivals o f carved-out subsidiaries
reflect the m arket’s concern about a potential redistribution o f wealth from outside
investors to parent-company shareholders, an effect associated with the issuance o f
equity that is not possible in a spin-off.
The returns to portfolios o f parent firm rivals are positive but not statistically
significant, a result that closely parallels results for rivals o f parents o f equity carveouts. The absence o f a significant return may reflect the lack o f an information effect
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or the fact that the breadth o f operations o f parent firms prevents effective matching
o f rival firms. Overall, the evidence indicates that a spin-off or an equity carve-out
decision communicates little information about the value o f the industry the parent
firm operates in.

5. Sell-offs
Table 11 contains general event study results for sell-off events. In column (1)
the returns to parent firms announcing a sell-off are a positive 1.69%, which is
strongly significant given a t-statistic o f 8.55. Approximately 55% o f the returns are
positive. These results closely parallel those reported for parents o f spin-offs and
carve-outs and are consistent with results found in previous sell-off studies. F o r
example, Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] find a significant positive return o f 1.66%
for a sample o f 53 sell-offs completed during the period 1963-1981. In the 6 months
p rior to a sell-off announcement, firms gain an average 5.01% , significant at the 1%
level. This implies that firms involved in sell-offs are not in distress which
contradicts the Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz finding, which is based on a sm aller sample
o f only firms filing 8-k reports.
T he positive and significant returns to firm s announcing a sell-off are
consistent with both the asymmetric information and efficiency hypotheses of
restructuring. To provide further insight on motivations for sell-offs, intra-industry
returns to these announcements are obtained. In column (2) rivals o f parent firms
have an average announcement return o f 0.03% , which is not statistically significant.
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Table 11
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firms announcing sell-offs,
sell-off parent rivals grouped by portfolio, and sell-off rivals grouped by portfolio.
Cum ulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.

Sell-off announcements
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals
of
sold-off
units

179 events

180 events
1623 rivals

203 events
1415 rivals

1.70” *
(8.55)

.03
(.25)

.04
(.24)

[.62]

[.49]

[.49]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

5.01’”
(3.29)

.01
(.01)

.00
(-00)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

.39
(.72)

.00
(.00)

.04
(.09)

.72

-.46

-.19

-4.73
to 4.17

-7.62 to
10.87

Two-day return
(-1,0)
Proportion o f
returns > 0

Median
(portfolio)
return

Range o f
-16.68 to
returns
42.34
’Significant at the 10% level.
’’Significant at the 5% level.
’’’Significant at the 1% level.
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M oreover, 49% o f the portfolios have positive returns. These portfolios also earn
normal returns in both the pre-event and post-event interval. The statistically
insignificant returns to parent rivals may indicate that no private inform ation is
conveyed or that there are no efficiency effects on industry rivals. Normal returns
may also be the result o f the private nature o f the sell-off transaction, counteracting
negative information effects o f raising external funds.
In contrast to spin-offs and carve-outs, portfolios o f rivals o f sold-off
subsidiaries show no abnormal returns around sell-off announcements. In column (3)
the average return to these rivals is 0.04% , with a t-statistic o f .24. A difference in
means test between the returns to rivals o f sold-off units and rivals o f carved-out units
yields a calculated t-value o f 1.93, rejecting the null hypothesis o f equality at the 10%
level. This is consistent with the securities issuance view that, because a sell-off
provides external funds for the firm without having to issue equity claims against the
unit, the information conveyed by the sell-off should be more favorable than that
conveyed in a carve-out.
M iller and R ock’s [1985] model o f security issuance implies that any external
funding decision by managers conveys unfavorable inform ation with respect to the
firm ’s future cash flows or investment prospects. This im plication is supported by the
higher mean returns to rivals o f spun-off units (.68% ) versus rivals o f sold-off units
(.04% ). A difference in means test between the returns for the two rival groups
obtains a t-value o f 1.89, which is statistically significant at the 10% level.
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The evidence from sell-offs indicates that this method o f divestm ent does not
lead to revaluation o f assets throughout the industry o f the sold-off unit. This may be
due to the fact that the private nature o f the sell-off transaction may counteract any
negative information that is released by the firm ’s use o f a sell-off to raise funds.
Alternatively, the norm al returns to rivals may suggest that any efficiency gains to be
achieved by the buyer o f the unit are not sufficiently large to materially change the
competitive structure o f the industry to which the sold-off unit belongs.

5.1. Buyers of the sold-off assets
Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] report positive and significant returns o f .83%
to 51 buyers o f asset sell-offs that are completed (t-statistic = 2.25) between 19631978. In contrast, the returns to 110 buyers in this sample (Table 12, colum n (1)) are
negative and statistically significant with a mean excess return o f -.71% and a tstatistic o f -2.99. Alm ost 60% o f the sample firm s experience a negative
announcement return. The pre-event and post-event interval returns are norm al.
Hite, Owers, and Rogers interpret the positive returns to sellers and buyers in
their sample as support for the efficiency hypothesis. Because assets are being moved
to higher valued uses both the buyer and the seller stand to gain from the transaction.
However, the negative returns to buyers in this sample are not consistent with this
interpretation.
T here are several sample differences that may account for the difference in
announcement reactions o f H ite, Owers, and R ogers’ buyer sample and this buyer
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Table 12
Cum ulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firms purchasing assets in an
announced sell-off transaction.
The returns for the entire sample are found in column (1). Returns to buyers who are
identified in the initial sale announcement are reported in column (2). Column (3)
contains the returns to buyers who are identified subsequent to the initial
announcement o f the asset sale. F or the latter group, day 0 is date o f the W all Street
Journal article associating the purchaser with the previously announced asset sale.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.

Sell-off announcement

All buyers

(2)
Buyers named in
initial sale
announcement

(3)
Buyers named
following initial
sale announcement

110 events

79 events

32 events

-.7 1 “ *
(-2.99)

-.6 5 "
(-2.19)

-.82“
(-2.11)

Proportion of
returns > 0

[-41]

[.41]

[-40]

Pre-event interval
(-121,-2)

-1.47
(-.79)

-1.19
(-.51)

-2.16
(-.72)

Post-event interval
(1,15)

.83
(1.27)

.90
(1.00)

.66
(.62)

-.32

-.63

-.80

-24.04 to
12.22

-8.99 to
4.31

(1)

Two-day return
(-1,0)

M edian return
Range o f Returns

-24.04 to
12.22
'Significant at the 10% level.
“ Significant at the 5% level.
‘“ Significant at the 1 % level.
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sample. First, the average asset sale by Hite, Owers, and Rogers is relatively small,
with a median value o f $42 million. In contrast, the median sell-off in this sample is
$507.1 million. Thus, bidder returns for larger sell-offs could more closely resemble
the negative returns in some studies o f acquisitions o f entire firms. Second, the
sample period o f this study is 1980-1991. In contrast, Hite, Owers, and R ogers’
sample period for buyers is 1963-1978. There is evidence o f an apparent negative
shift in the returns to bidders in m erger and acquisition transactions in the 1980’s
which may also be typical o f returns to buyers o f sold-off assets during the same
periods.
In particular, the negative returns to buyers o f sold-off assets are comparable
to the average negative returns found for firms making tender offers during the 1980’s
reported by Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter [1988] and Bradley, Desai and Kim [1988].
Consistent with these results, You, Caves, Smith and Henry [1986] show that the
distribution o f returns to bidders in mergers and acquisitions (1975 to 1984) has a
mean of -1 %, and 53% o f the returns are negative. The negative returns to bidder
firms are attributed to increased governmental regulation and more effective takeover
defenses. However, it is not apparent that these explanations apply to sell-offs.
Regulatory influence is not an obvious factor in any o f these sell-off transactions, and
there is no need to overcome takeover defense tactics - these asset sales are all
negotiated and represent a voluntary decision by the selling firm. Thus, while the
apparent pattern o f positive returns in the 1960’s and 1970’s and negative returns in
the 1980’s to buyers o f sold-off assets parallels that o f returns to bidders in
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acquisitions, some explanations for the latter paradigm are not applicable to the
form er. F urther testing fails to produce a definitive, satisfactory explanation for the
significantly average negative returns to the buyers in sell-off transactions, suggesting
that sell-off purchasers may be characterized by hubris behavior as described by Roll
[1986]. These tests are explained in the discussion that follows.
To gain further insight on the pattern o f returns to buyers, separate returns are
calculated for buyers who are identified in the initial sale announcement versus those
who are identified in a subsequent announcement, reported in columns (2) and (3) o f
Table 12 respectively. The results o f this breakdown suggest that regardless o f when
the buyer is announced, the returns to the transaction announcement are, on average,
significantly negative. F or buyers named in the initial announcement, the returns are
-.65% ( t = - 2 .19). F or buyers named in a subsequent announcement, the A PE is .82% (t= -2 .1 1 ). Tables 13 and 14 report the related returns to the seller, rivals o f
the seller, and rivals o f the sold-off unit when the buyer is identified in the initial
announcem ent versus in a subsequent announcement. T he returns to the sellers in
each group are positive and strongly significant, indicating that the timing o f
identification o f a buyer has little im pact on the announcem ent reaction to the selling
firm s. The returns to parent rival portfolios and sold-off unit rival portfolios are
unaffected by the timing o f disclosure o f the buyer. N one o f the parent o r unit rival
portfolios experience abnormal announcement returns.
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Table 13
Cum ulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s announcing an asset(s)
sale, their intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the unit being sold, and the purchaser of
the asset(s).
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Buyer named in the initial asset sale announcement
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

128 events

129 events
1174 rivals

158 events
1109 rivals

78 events

1.63"*
(6.95)

.08
(.55)

.05
(.30)

-.6 5 "
(-2.19)

[.58]

[-49]

[-51]

[-41]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

5 .4 2 " ’
(3.00)

-.00
(-.00)

.01
(-01)

-1.19
(-.51)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

-.10
(-.16)

-.01
(.03)

.04
(.08)

.90
(1.00)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.45

-.05

.02

-.63

-4.73 to
10.87

-7.62 to
4.85

-24.04 to
12.22

Two-day
return
(-1,0)
Proportion of
returns > 0

Range of
-12.31 to
returns
31.44
'Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
’"Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)

Buyer
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Table 14
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s announcing an asset(s)
sale, their intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the unit being sold, and the purchaser o f
the asset(s). These sales were initially announced without identifying the purchaser o f
the asset(s).
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion of positive returns are in brackets.
Buyer named subsequent to the initial asset sale announcement
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

51 events

51 events
449 rivals

45 events
306 rivals

32 events

1.86*"
(4.96)

-.09
(-.42)

-.02
(-.06)

-.8 2 "
(-2-11)

[.70]

[-49]

[-42]

[-39]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

3.99
(1-31)

.03
(.02)

-.01
(-.00)

-2.16
(-.72)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

1.64
(1.52)

-.03
(-.06)

.02
(.03)

.66
(.62)

Median
(portfolio)
return

1.78

-.06

-.20

-.80

-3.41 to
3.78

-3.42 to
5.35

-8.99 to
4.31

Two-day
return
(-1,0)
Proportion o f
returns > 0

Range o f
-16.68 to
returns
42.34
"Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
" ‘Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)

Buyer

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118

5.2. Sell-offs and the potential for collusion
Because a sell-off may decrease the number o f independent producers o f a
product, the equity value of buying firms and rival firm s may be affected by an
increased potential for collusion due to a m ore restricted oligopoly. Therefore, the
purchase o f a sold-off subsidiary by another industry member may create an increase
in market power and profits within the industry. In this case, the predicted returns
for buyers, sellers, and intra-industry rivals are each positive, reflecting the potential
increases in market power and profitability. This hypothesis is tested by dividing the
entire group o f sell-offs between those where the buyer is in the same industry as the
sold-off unit, i.e. a horizontal sell-off, and those where the buyer is not.
The empirical results for the horizontal sell-off groups are reported in Table
15. The sellers (column (1)) experience a positive and statistically significant mean
return o f 1.19% (t-statistic = 4.42). Returns to the portfolios o f parent rivals and
unit rivals are .02% and .09% , respectively, and are not statistically significant. The
mean return to the buyer group is -.51% , which is not statistically significant at the
5% level (t= -1 .8 1 )
The empirical results for the non-horizontal group o f buyers are found in Table
16. Sell-off parents experience a positive mean return o f 2.30% , significant at the
1% level (t= 9 .4 2 ), which exceeds the return to firms that sell to buyers belonging to
the same industry as the sold-off unit. Again, the returns to the rival portfolios o f the
parents and sold-off units are normal (.04 and -.03 respectively). The buyers, who
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Table 15
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for N YSE/AM EX firm s announcing a
horizontal sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the
purchaser o f the unit. A horizontal sell-off is defined as the purchaser and the soldo ff unit sharing the same 4-digit SIC code.
Cum ulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Horizontal sell-offs
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

98 events

104 events
905 rivals

114 events
775 rivals

75 events

1.19*“
(4.42)

.03
(.18)

.09
(.43)

-.51*
(-1.81)

Proportion
o f returns
> 0

(.63]

[-51]

[-48]

[.39]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

3.50*
(1.68)

.00
(.00)

-.01
(-.00)

-1.28
(-.58)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

.85
(1.14)

.02
(.03)

.03
(.07)

.59
(.76)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.76

.01

-.17

-.75

-4.73 to
4.17

-7.62 to
10.87

-10.68 to
12.22

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

Range o f
-12.31 to
returns
15.11
‘Significant at the 10% level.
“ Significant at the 5 % level.
“ ‘Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)
All
buyers
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Table 16
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s announcing a non
horizontal sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the
purchaser o f the unit. A non-horizontal sell-off is defined as the purchaser and the
sold-off unit having different 4-digit SIC codes.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. T he proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Non-horizontal sell-offs
(4)

(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

81 events

76 events
718 rivals

89 events
640 rivals

35 events

2.30"*
(9.42)

.04
(.17)

-.03
(-.12)

-1.13***
(-2.75)

Proportion
of returns
> 0

[-60]

[-46]

[-51]

[-48]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

6.79"*
(3.72)

.02
(.01)

.02
(.01)

-1.89
(-.60)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

-.14
(-.22)

-.02
(-.03)

.03
(.05)

1.35
(1.20)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.60

-.09

-.03

-.25

-2.07 to
2.96

-3.86 to
4.85

-24.01 to
5.74

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

Range of
-16.68 to
returns
42.34
'Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
‘"Significant at the 1 % level.

All
buyers
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are entering the industry through the purchase o f the sold-off subsidiary, experience a
negative and significant return o f -1.13% (t= -2.75).
W hile it appears that horizontal sales redistribute some o f the gains associated
with asset sale transactions from the sellers to the buyers, difference in means tests
indicate that the returns to the horizontal sellers (buyers) and non-horizontal sellers
(buyers) are not significantly different from each other. A difference in means test
between the returns to horizontal sellers (buyers) and non-horizontal sellers (buyers)
generates a t-statistic o f 1.22 (.75). These results, combined with the normal returns
to unit rival portfolios, provide no support for the possibility that sell-offs within an
industry systematically create a collusive environment.

5.3. Sell-offs involving multiple bidders
It is possible that the auction environment could be responsible for the negative
returns to buyers. In particular, the presence o f a m ultiple bid auction for an asset
may alter returns by increasing the seller’s return and reducing the returns to bidders.
In this way, m ultiple bids may lead to a negative return to buyers through the
"w inner’s curse". Roll [1986] offers the winner’s curse as an explanation for
overpaym ent in mergers generally, and results for buyers in asset acquisitions could
reflect a sim ilar effect.
T he im pact o f an auction environment on the equity values o f sellers and
buyers is analyzed by obtaining the returns associated with sell-offs that have multiple
bidders. Column (1) o f Table 17 contains the returns to sellers who utilized an
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Table 17
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s announcing an asset(s)
sale associated with m ultiple bids for the asset(s), intra-industry rivals, the rivals of
the unit being sold, and the purchaser o f the asset(s).
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Asset sales with multiple bidders
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

19 events

22 events
190 rivals

25 events
198 rivals

20 events

Two-day
return
(-1,0)

.67
(.89)

-.34
(-1.14)

.23
(.53)

-.54
(-.82)

Proportion o f
returns > 0

[-67]

[-41]

[-27]

[.30]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

-1.25
(-.21)

-.02
(-.01)

-.07
(-.02)

-5.51
(-1.09)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

2.35
(1.14)

.01
(.02)

.00
(.00)

.51
(.28)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.76

-.24

-.84

-1.37

-3.42 to
2.73

-4.00 to
5.74

-2.49 to
5.06

Range o f
-7.91 to
returns
6.40
'Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5% level.
" ’Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)

Buyer
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auction form at for their asset sale. The returns to this relatively small group o f 19
events upon announcing the auction are positive (.67% ) but not significant. T he
average return to the announcement o f the winning bidder, -.54% , is not statistically
different from zero. Thus, the mean returns to each group are sm aller than the mean
returns for the overall seller sample and not statistically significant. The lack o f
significance may reflect the small sample size (n = 19), but it is clear that the negative
returns to buyers as a whole cannot be explained by returns associated with multiple
bid auctions. Equity values o f sell-off parent rivals and sold-off unit rivals appear to
be unaffected by multiple bid asset sales.

5.4. Type of proceeds from the sale
Studies by Gordon and Yagil [1981], W ansley, Lane, and Yang [1983], and
Travlos [1985, 1987] find higher abnormal returns to target firms for cash offers than
for stock offers in m erger and acquisition transactions. These studies also reveal
negative and significant announcement returns (-1.47% ) to bidders offering equity as a
method o f paym ent, while bidders offering cash experience normal announcement
returns. T he negative returns in m erger and acquisition transactions are consistent
with the implications o f the M yers and M ajluf [1984] model o f securities issuance;
that is, managers issue equity in their own firm when they feel the equity is
overvalued by the market. This argument is tested for sell-off transactions to see if
the means o f paym ent is responsible for the presence o f negative returns to buyers.
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Table 18 (column (1)) contains the returns to relevant groups w here sales
proceeds consist o f cash and other non-equity forms o f paym ent for the sold-off
asset(s). Returns to announcements o f sell-offs where the medium o f exchange
involves equity are found in Table 19. The buyers offering non-equity form s o f
paym ent experience significant negative announcement returns o f -.65% with a tstatistic o f -2.67. Pre-event and post-event returns are norm al for these firms. The
relatively small number o f buyers (n = 13) offering equity as a form o f paym ent for
acquired assets experience normal announcement returns (-.87% , t= -1 .0 2 ), pre-event
returns (-7.50% , t = - l . 15) and post-event returns (3.15% , t = 1.37). A difference in
means test between the returns for the two buyer groups generates a t-value o f .46 (pvalue = .65), indicating failure to reject the null hypothesis that the mean returns are
equal.
Announcement returns to selling firms receiving cash and other non-equity
form s o f compensation from an asset sale are 1.62% and strongly significant
(t= 7 .9 2 ). The selling firm s have a significant positive return o f 5.61% (t= 3 .5 5 ) in
the pre-event interval and normal returns of .35% in the post-event interval. F or sello ff parents (n = 1 4 ) receiving equity in exchange for assets announcem ent returns
(.95% , t = 1.36), pre-event returns (1.01% , t= .1 9 ), and post-event returns (1.53% ,
t = . 80) are all normal. A difference in means test between these two seller groups
also fails to reject the null hypothesis that the mean returns are different from each
other (t-value = .56). W hether an asset sale involves equity as a medium o f
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Table 18
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s receiving cash and
other non-equity forms o f compensation as proceeds from a sell-off. Also included
are cum ulative excess returns for intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit,
and the purchaser o f the unit.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. T he proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Cash and other non-equity forms o f proceeds from asset sales
(4)

(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

162 events

164 events
1454 rivals

183 events
1224 rivals

96 events

1.62” *
(7.92)

.00
(.02)

.07
(.45)

-.65*"
(-2.67)

Proportion
o f returns
> 0

[.61]

[.49]

[.49]

[•40]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

5.6 1 ” *
(3.55)

.02
(.02)

.00
(■00)

-.38
(-.20)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

.35
(.63)

-.00
(-.00)

.05
(.13)

.50
(.73)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.67

-.05

-.03

-.81

-4.73 to
3.78

-7.62 to
10.87

-10.68 to
10.36

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

Range o f
-16.68 to
42.34
returns
'Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
" ’Significant at the 1 % level.

All
buyers
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Table 19
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s receiving a
combination o f cash, equity, and notes as proceeds from a sell-off. Also included are
cumulative excess returns for intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and
the purchaser of the unit.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Equity included in the proceeds from asset sales
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals of
sold-off
units

14 events

13 events
112 rivals

17 events
155 rivals

13 events

Two-day
return
(-1,0)

.95
(1.36)

.23
(.48)

-.22
(-.33)

-.87
(-1.02)

Proportion o f
returns > 0

[.57]

[.46]

[.50]

[.52]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

1.01
(.19)

-.10
(-.03)

.04
(.01)

-7.50
(-1.15)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

1.53
(.80)

.11
(.09)

-.10
(-.05)

3.15
(1.37)

Median
(portfolio)
return

1.45

-.11

2.03

.59

-1.42 to
4.17

-24.04 to
12.22

-6.91 to
14.85

Range o f
-7.36 to
returns
9.55
'Significant at the 10% level.
“ Significant at the 5 % level.
“ ‘Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)

Buyer
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exchange or not, rivals o f the selling firm as well as those o f the sold-off unit
experience normal announcement, pre-event, and post-event returns.
Thus, the empirical results on the type o f proceeds offered as paym ent for
sold-off assets do not parallel those for m erger and acquisition transactions. M ore
specifically, there is no evidence that returns to buyers offering equity to sellers are
lower than for buyers who offer cash and debt securities as a means o f payment.
Thus, negative returns to buyers o f asset sales are not the result o f equity issuance by
buyers.

5.5. Sell-offs by distressed firms
Distressed asset sales are defined as sell-offs by firms currently in
reorganization under Chapter 11 (n = 4 ), in private workouts (n = 5 ), or those that have
om itted a dividend in the 12 months prior to the sale (n = 9 ). Returns to two firms in
bankruptcy, one firm in a private workout, and one firm that had omitted dividends
are not available and therefore these firm s are deleted from the sample o f selling
firms. However, rival portfolios for all four o f these parent firm s are available and
included in the analysis.
Generally the announcement o f these sales is likely to indicate that the firm is
under pressure to divest the assets swiftly in order to raise funds to repay debt
obligations or otherw ise meet cash needs. Proceeds from these sales are typically
cash, and the transactions tend to be brought to fruition quickly. D ue to the pressure
to sell, the seller may not have tim e or be able to negotiate the appropriate price for
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the assets, especially since its state o f distress and need for capital are public
information. Therefore, potential bidders may be able to purchase the assets at a
price below the m arket’s expectation o f the value o f the assets to the seller. In this
case the average returns to sellers in distress may be lower than the average return to
sellers who are not in distress. Likewise, the average returns to the purchasers o f
assets sold by a distressed firm may b e higher than the average returns to purchasers
o f assets sold by non-distressed firm s. In this regard, James and W eir [1987] report
significantly positive returns to bidders that acquire banks that have been seized by
regulatory authorities.
Empirical results to announcements o f sell-offs by firm s in distress are
reported in Table 20. The returns to sellers are positive (.99% ) but not significant
( t = .94). Buyers experience a positive and significant average return o f 1.80% with a
t-statistic o f 2.77. In contrast, empirical results to non-distressed sales, reported in
Table 21, indicate that returns to sellers and buyers parallel those found for the entire
sample. The A PE for non-distressed sellers is 1.76% with a corresponding t-statistic
o f 8.99, indicating significance at the 1% level. The A PE for buyers in nondistressed sales is -1.08% (t= -4 .4 7 ), also significant at the 1% level. M oreover, a
difference in means test generates a calculated t-value o f 2.32 (p-value = .02)
indicating that the A PE’s for the two buyer groups are statistically different from each
other at the 5% level. A difference in means test for the two seller groups produces a
t-value of .35 (p-value = .75) and fails to reject the null hypothesis that the means
returns to the two groups are equal. Although these results should be interpreted with
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Table 20
Cum ulative excess returns (in percent) for distressed NYSE/AM EX firms announcing
a sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the purchaser o f the
unit. A distressed sell-off is defined as a sell-off by a firm in Chapter 11 or by a firm
that omitted a dividend during the 12 months prior to the announcement.
Cum ulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. T he t-statistics are in
parentheses. T he proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Asset sales by distressed parent firms
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals of
sold-off
units

14 events

18 events
166 rivals

15 events
134 rivals

14 events

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

.99
(.94)

-.41
(-1.23)

-.43
(-.67)

1.80” *
(2.77)

Proportion
o f returns
> 0

[.71]

[-39]

[-40]

[-69]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

-3.42
(-.41)

-.00
(-.00)

.01
(.00)

2.77
(.55)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

4.63
(1.60)

-.05
(-.06)

-.13
(-.07)

.36
(.20)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.91

-.24

-.65

1.24

-3.14 to
3.49

-4.45 to
3.85

-5.59 to
10.51

Range o f
-16.68 to
returns
17.12
'Significant at the 10% level.
“ Significant at the 5 % level.
“ ‘Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)
All
buyers
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Table 21
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX non-distressed firms
announcing a sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the
purchaser o f the unit. A non-distressed sell-off is defined as an asset sale by a firm
that is neither in Chapter 11 or nor has omitted a dividend during the 12 months prior
to the announcement.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum of excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses.
Asset sales by non-distressed parent firms
(1)

(2)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

(3)
Rivals o f
sold-off
units

165 events

162 events
1457 rivals

188 events
1281 rivals

96 events

1.76“ *
(8.99)

.08
(.63)

.07
(.48)

-1.08***
(-4.41)

Proportion
o f returns
> 0

[•61]

[-50]

[.50]

[.37]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

5.7 7 ” *
(3.86)

.01
(.01)

.00
(.00)

-2.09
(-1.08)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

.03
(.06)

.01
(.02)

.05
(.11)

.91
(1.32)

Median
(portfolio)
return

.63

-.01

.00

-1.02

-4.73 to
4.17

-7.62 to
10.87

-24.04 to
12.22

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

Range of
-12.31 to
returns
42.34
'Significant at the 10% level.
“ Significant at the 5 % level.
' “ Significant at the 1 % level.

(4)
All
buyers
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caution due to the small sample size o f distressed sales (n = 1 4 ), the pattern o f returns
is consistent with the notion that distressed sales cause a redistribution o f the overall
gains from a sell-off away from the seller. The results also strengthen the conclusion
that returns to buyers o f sold-off assets that are not associated with distressed sellers
are strongly negative.

5.6. Retention and uses of proceeds from sell-offs
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] report positive and significant returns to selloff announcements for firm s that use the proceeds from a sell-off to repay debt. No
firms in their sample repurchased equity. In contrast, they find normal announcement
returns for firms w ho retain the proceeds. They conclude that the positive returns to
sellers reducing their leverage can be attributed to avoidance o f economically
significant costs o f financial distress and the avoidance o f the agency costs o f free
cash flow that pervade firms that do retain the proceeds. T heir conclusions also imply
that retaining the proceeds for any reason, even if such sales are a source o f funding
investment in areas o f firm expertise, produce norm al returns to asset sales.
Table 22 contains the empirical results for selling firm s and their rivals,
disaggregated by whether the firm retains the proceeds or does not retain the proceeds
from asset sales. Sellers retaining proceeds (column (1)) experience a positive and
significant mean return o f 1.29% (t= 5 .2 9 ). This is in contrast to the Lang, Poulsen
and Stulz result o f norm al returns to these sellers. Sellers using the proceeds to
reduce debt, repurchase equity, or both, also experience a positive and strongly
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Table 22
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s retaining the proceeds
from sell-offs and those not retaining the proceeds (i.e. proceeds use to reduce debt,
repurchase equity, or both). Also included are cumulative excess returns for intra
industry rivals o f the parents and the units for the respective samples.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Firm s retaining proceeds

Firm s not retaining proceeds

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

Sell-off
parents

Parent
Rivals

129 events

127 events
1139 rivals

50 events

53 events
484 rivals

1.29"*
(5.29)

.06
(.37)

2.77"*
(7.89)

-.03
(-.16)

Proportion
o f returns
> 0

[.60]

[.46]

[•67]

[.60]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

4.87"*
(2.58)

.01
(.01)

5 .3 5 "
(1.99)

.00
(.00)

Post-event
interval

.86
(1.30)

.01
(.02)

-.84
(-.88)

-.02
(-.04)

.67

-.11

2.30

.28

-3.41 to
3.78

-10.34 to
42.34

-4.73 to
4.17

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

(1,15)
Median
(portfolio)
return

Range o f
-16.68 to
31.44
returns
'Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
" ’Significant at the 1 % level.
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significant announcement return o f 2.77% (t= 7 .8 9 ), which is close to the figure o f
3.14% reported by Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz. Both groups o f firm s in this sample
show a strong positive return in the six months prior to the announcement and normal
returns in the 3 weeks subsequent to the announcement. A difference in means test
for the announcement returns to both seller groups generates a calculated t-value o f
1.22 (p-value = .22). Thus, this pattern in announcement returns to asset sales is
consistent with the findings o f Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz that firms not retaining the
proceeds from asset sales tend to have higher average announcement returns, but
contrary to Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, firms that retain proceeds have significantly
positive returns.
The differences found in the results o f Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz versus this
study may be driven by the fact that their study has a relatively high proportion o f
firm s in some distress, whereas the sample o f large divestitures found in this study
contains very few distressed sell-offs. M ore specifically, the median dollar value o f
the sell-off ($28 million) and the market value o f the selling firms ($150 million) in
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz are small relative to the median values o f found in this study
o f $507 million and $2.4 billion, respectively. Overall, the results in this study
suggest that agency problems may play a role in asset sales, but even firm s that retain
proceeds generate positive returns from sell-offs. Returns to the rivals o f the sellers
who retain proceeds and those who do not (columns (2) and (4) respectively) are
normal in each case. This result indicates that no industry information is released
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from asset sales which supports the notion that firm specific agency problems may
play a role in the return to sellers.
The sample o f sellers not retaining the sell-off proceeds is analyzed further to
determ ine if the form of disbursement, i.e. reducing debt or repurchasing equity, has
an im pact on the announcement returns. The results are reported in Table 23. A
sample o f 33 firm s are identified as declaring the intent to reduce debt with the sello ff proceeds in the initial announcement o f the sale (column (1)). Returns to these
selling firm s are positive (2.82% ) and strongly significant (t= 6 .3 8 ). These firms
experience normal returns in the pre-event and post-event intervals. Rivals o f these
firm s experience normal announcement
(-.13% ), pre-event, and post-event returns (column (2)).
A sample o f 13 firms (column (3)) is obtained for sellers using the proceeds
from a sell-off to repurchase equity. These firms experience a mean return o f 3.14%
with a t-statistic o f 6.34, which is significant at the 1% level. These firms have a
strong positive pre-event return o f 13.48% (t= 3 .5 1 ). Post-event returns are normal
(.80% with t= .5 9 ). M oreover, the rival portfolios corresponding to these firms
(column (4)) also experience a significant positive announcem ent return o f .81%
(t= 2 .0 3 ). Significant positive returns to intra-industry rivals suggest that favorable
private managerial information may be conveyed by these announcements about the
future profitability o f the parent firm ’s industry, the value o f the assets in place, or an
expected change in the risk o f the industry. These results are consistent with the
literature on share repurchase announcements (Dann [1981], Vermalen [1981]). The
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Table 23
Cum ulative excess returns (in percent) for two samples o f NYSE/AM EX firms
retaining the proceeds from sell-offs; one sample used the proceeds to reduce debt
proceeds and the other used the proceeds to repurchase equity. Also included are
cum ulative excess returns for intra-industry rivals o f the parents and the units for the
respective samples.
Cum ulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Firm s reducing debt

Firm s repurchasing equity

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Sell-off
parents

Parent
rivals

Sell-off
parents

Parent
Rivals

33 events

41 events
396 rivals

13 events

8 events
58 rivals

2.82"*
(6.38)

-.13
(-.60)

3.14"*
(6.34)

.8 1 "
(2.03)

Proportion
o f returns
> 0

[-67]

[.51]

[.69]

[-75]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

1.92
(.57)

-.01
(-.00)

13.48*"
(3.51)

.08
(.02)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

-.82
(-.68)

-.00
(-.00)

.80
(.59)

.00
(.00)

M edian
(portfolio)
return

1.33

.09

3.88

.63

-3.54 to
3.49

-9.00 to
16.73

-1.24 to
4.17

Two-day
Returns
(-1,0)

-10.34 to
Range o f
42.34
returns
’Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
‘"Significant at the 1 % level.
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positive returns to the rival firms in this sample, however, contrasts with Hertzel
[1991], who finds no intra-industry effects for share repurchase announcements. In
addition, it should be noted that this intra-industry effect is based on a small sample
size (n = 8 ).
The overall results generally parallel the findings o f Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz
that there are greater returns to sell-offs in which proceeds are to be paid out rather
than retained within the firm. However, they find that positive returns accrue only to
firms announcing a sell-off and the intent to reduce debt with the proceeds. Empirical
results from tests in this study indicate that firm s that do retain proceeds also have
positive announcement returns. This difference may be due to the fact that their
sample includes a substantial number o f relatively small, distressed firms, whereas the
incidence o f distressed firms in this sample o f relatively large firms is less than 10%.

5.7. The effect of general restructuring announcements
To gain further insight on the information effects o f sell-offs, empirical results
for 38 general restructuring announcements are obtained and reported in Table 24.
These announcements typically report a general intention to shed less profitable
businesses and increase investment in core businesses by using the proceeds from
divestitures. The average two-day return to these announcements is 3.22% , with a tstatistic o f 8.16 and 68% o f the sample have positive announcem ent returns. The pre
event period return is a positive and statistically significant 6.52% , and the post-event
returns are norm al. Thus, the market regards announcements in which the firm
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Table 24
Cum ulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firm s announcing a
restructuring and their intra-industry rivals grouped by portfolio.
Cum ulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods.
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Restructuring announcements
(1)
Restructuring
firms

(2)
Rivals o f
Restructuring
firms

38 events

33 events
385 rivals

3.22"*
(8.16)

.5 5 "
(2.12)

[.68]

[.58]

Pre-event
interval
(-121,-2)

6 .5 2 "
(2.13)

.01
(.02)

Post-event
interval
(1,15)

-1.50
(-1.39)

.08
(.11)

2.20

.33

-2.56 to
15.56

-4.34
to 7.73

Two-day return
(-1,0)
Proportion o f
returns > 0

M edian (portfolio)
return
Range of
returns
Significant at the 10% level.
"Significant at the 5 % level.
" ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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indicates a willingness to sell a broad array o f assets and focus on core businesses as
favorable news. M oreover, for the rivals o f these firm s, the average two-day return
is 0.55% and t-statistic is 2.12 with 58% o f the returns positive. These results
support the view that managers are optimistic about the value o f the firm ’s core assets
and the market reacts to this signal by increasing the equity o f the parent firm ’s
rivals.
An efficiency explanation for the returns for restructuring firms and their rivals
is inconsistent with this result. The magnitude o f the average returns for restructuring
announcements suggests that the market expects a material increase in the profitability
o f these firm s. I f this increase were expected to com e at the expense o f intra-industry
rivals, the rivals would experience negative stock-price reactions. Instead, there is a
significantly positive announcement effect for rivals which is consistent with the view
that the industry related to the firm ’s core activities is judged to have favorable future
prospects. Therefore, the restructuring announcement signals managerial beliefs about
the future profitability o f the industry rather than an indication o f their greater
comparative advantage within the industry.
These results are also inconsistent with the agency cost hypothesis.
Restructuring announcements indicate mangers are anticipating substantial cash flows
into the firm that are to be redirected into core activities. If these cash flows were
viewed by the market as increasing agency costs, the share price response should not
be positive. M oreover, if firm specific agency factors were dominant there would be
no effect on intra-industry rivals. Instead, the m arket’s positive reaction to
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announcing firm s and their rivals in response to restructuring announcem ents indicates
that managers are viewed as making appropriate financing and investment decisions
conducive to shareholder wealth maximization and that there are positive prospects for
the industry as a whole.

6. Summary
The overall empirical results reported here provide evidence consistent with the
predictions o f the asymmetric inform ation hypothesis o f securities issuance when
viewed within the context o f corporate restructuring decisions involving equity carveouts and spin-offs, and with respect to initial public offerings. The returns also
confirm the hypothesis that some restructuring decisions involving securities issuance
convey elements o f information relevant for valuing sim ilar assets in related activities.
The strongest piece o f evidence for these conclusions is the announcem ent reactions o f
intra-industry rivals for carve-outs, IPO s and spin-offs. The returns to intra-industry
rivals o f equity carve-outs and IPOs are significant and negative, -1.05% and -.88% ,
respectively. These results are consistent with models o f security issuance which
imply that equity issues are negative signals o f managerial expectations about future
cash flows o f relevant assets. The norm al returns to sold-off unit rivals and the
positive returns to rivals o f the spun-off units are also consistent with securities
issuance arguments. Because m anagers choose to undergo an economic restructuring
w ithout issuing equity in the parent firm or a subsidiary, the returns to these kinds o f
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transactions should be better received by the market. The rival returns to spin-off
decisions contradict the negative predictions derived from the efficiency hypothesis.
N orm al returns to portfolios o f rivals o f parent firms announcing an equity
carve-out or spin-off indicate that these announcements contain little industry-common
inform ation with respect to the activities o f the parent’s business. This provides little
support for Nanda’s hypothesis that an equity carve-out conveys favorable news about
the value o f the parent firm. It is also possible that the breadth o f activities o f parent
operations is too extensive to generate an accurate matching o f industry related
activities based on SIC codes, thus weakening the power o f the test relative to the
case o f the subsidiaries.
T he positive and significant returns to parent firms announcing sell-offs are
consistent with the findings reported in earlier studies. The normal returns to parent
and subsidiary rivals to sell-off announcements indicate that this method o f divestment
does not lead to revaluation o f assets throughout the related industries. The negative
and significant returns to buyers o f sold-off assets contrast with the positive and
significant returns to buyers reported by Hite, Owers and Rogers [1987]. The
differences in returns may be due to differences in the sample period, the relative size
o f the divestitures, which tend to get larger through time, or the financial soundness
o f the sample firms.
Because of the relatively large size o f these divestitures, and therefore the
similarity to mergers and acquisitions, factors affecting the returns to bidders in
control transactions are examined to determ ine if similar factors apply for returns to
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buyers o f sold-off units. Empirical results indicate that: (1) the time the buyer is
identified, whether in the initial sale announcement or in a subsequent announcement,
has no impact on the returns to the sellers or the buyers, (2) multiple bid auctions
cannot explain the negative returns to buyers, (3) buyers using equity as a medium o f
exchange do not experience returns statistically different from those who do not use
equity to purchase divested units, and (4) that buyers purchasing assets from sellers in
distress experience positive and significant returns. Distressed asset sales appear to be
the only type o f sell-off where buyers share in the gains from the transaction.
Finally, Lang, Poulsen and Stulz argue that potential agency problems arising
from increased free cash flow can influence the returns to firm s announcing asset
sales. They report that only firms that disburse proceeds from asset sales by reducing
debt experience positive and significant returns. Firms retaining sale proceeds, even
if such proceeds are used to further investment in core business activities and areas o f
expertise, experience norm al returns. In contrast, stock price reactions to sell-off
announcements in this sample indicate that sellers who retain proceeds, as well as
those who do not, are positive and significant. M oreover, the positive and significant
returns to firms announcing general restructurings in order to focus on core
businesses, and their rivals, indicate that retention o f proceeds for such uses is viewed
by the market as shareholder wealth maximizing behavior. Thus, although agency
problem s apparently play some role in asset sell-offs, it is clear that there are also
positive wealth effects associated with increased investment in areas o f the firm ’s
expertise.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions

The purpose o f this dissertation has been to explore the motivation behind
various restructuring choices within a securities issuance context. Previous theoretical
models and empirical evidence suggest that three methods o f restructuring - equity
carve-outs, sell-offs, and spin-offs, on average, signal favorable information about
parent firms. This has been interpreted as reflecting either enhanced potential for
efficiency gains, positive asymmetric information about the value o f industry assets,
o r changes in agency costs. This disseration presents an alternative fram ework by
relating restructuring announcements to the effects o f security issuance. Empirical
tests are formulated to determine if these announcements contain valuable private
inform ation about the value o f a subsidiary by analyzing whether o r not elements o f
this information apply to other firm s involved in related activities. Similarly, if
favorable news associated with restructuring announcements indicates that parent firm
equity is undervalued, equity values o f intra-industry rivals may also be affected by
restructuring decisions.
Announcements o f equity carve-outs are interpreted within N anda’s [1991]
M yers and M ajluf-type framework. T he results are consistent with the hypothesis that
a motivation for these events is m anagem ent’s belief that a subsidiary is likely to be
overvalued by the market. In particular, rivals of the carved out subsidiary
experience negative revaluation effects. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to
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support arguments made by Nanda [1991] that managers carve out a subsidiary
because they believe that the parent firm ’s equity is undervalued by the market since
rivals o f parents do not have significant positive valuation effects. Instead, rivals o f
parent firms earn normal returns.
A spin-off is a form o f divestiture that does not involve external financing.
Rivals o f spun-off subsidiaries increase in value around these announcements.
M anagem ent’s apparent unwillingness to sell the subsidiary in a private transaction or
offer public equity claims on the subsidiary suggests managers believe the subsidiary’s
asset value is greater than the proceeds these transactions would produce and that firm
value will increase as information from the newly independent subsidiary is released.
This type o f divestiture implies a parallel argument for the parent firm being spun o ff
since managers may view their entire firm as being undervalued by the market relative
to the value conditioned on their inside information. Nevertheless, although intra
industry rivals o f the subsidiary experience positive stock-price reactions to the spin
o ff announcem ent, returns to rivals o f the parent, although positive, are not
significant.
Because a sell-off can be viewed as a method o f external financing that allows
managers to avoid an equity issue, stock price responses o f rivals o f a subsidiary to be
sold o ff are predicted to be less negative than for a carve-out. Consistent with this
view, rivals o f assets to be sold o ff earn normal returns. Arguments about effects on
rivals o f the parent firm announcing a sell-off parallel those o f equity carve-out
decisions, except that sell-off announcements release the news that funds are to be
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raised without an equity issue, suggesting that managers believe that parent firm
equity is not overvalued. Although sell-off announcements do not generate significant
intra-industry effects, there are significant positive share price reactions to rivals of
restructuring firm s. This indicates that positive information is released by these
announcements about the value o f the core assets of parents. This suggests that the
favorable information released by these decisions pertains to m anagers’ favorable
expectations about the parent firm.
The market for conventional IPOs is typically viewed as suffering from
adverse selection problems. Potential investors view corporate insiders o f privatelyheld firms as having the incentive to time a going public transaction to correspond to
unfavorable inside information. Aware o f these incentives, rational investors offer an
appropriately low average price for IPOs. Similar to equity carve-outs, the
announcement o f the intent to go public releases elements o f industry-common
inform ation that causes downward revaluation o f intra-industry rivals o f the
announcing firm. Together with the equity carve-out results, this evidence suggests
that there is a negative signal content to going public. Thus, the decision to
restructure a firm by selling equity to the public, even as an element o f a corporate
restructuring, is a negative signal about the value of the relevant industry.
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